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Interviewer: Bayor, Ronald H.

Interviewee: Gladin, Collier

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RONALD BAYOR: Five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten.

(break in recording)

BAYOR: What I'm doing is trying to write a study on the impact of race, race relations, on development of Atlanta, and then, later on, just racism. How race impacts (inaudible) decisions. I've got a few questions I thought I could go over. First of all, let me get this -- the positions you've held and what years (inaudible).

COLLIER GLADIN: OK. Well, I started with the city, in the Hartsfield administration, as parts engineer. My basic degree was in landscape and architecture, and I got graduate work from Tech and Carnegie Mellon. [01:00] I was parts engineer from '56 to '58 when I went into the planning. So basically, I was one of the planners up until about '59, and then I was chief planner for the city until '65, and then director of planning from '65 to '79.

BAYOR: Through the Allen -- part of the Allen administration.

GLADIN: Yeah, all of Allen -- well, Allen appointed me to the [02:00] directorship, but I was basically chief planner at the beginning of his reign, and then all the way through Massell and

into the Jackson.

BAYOR: And then I guess Leon [Eplan?] took over that leadership role.

GLADIN: Well, Leon came in as a result of a charter. In other words, total new charter for the city. Reorganization of city government. Under the new structure of reorganization, Eplan came in.

BAYOR: He was commissioner of planning (inaudible)?

GLADIN: Yeah.

BAYOR: OK, let me go on to a few things that I've heard from other people but I wanted you to either corroborate or get your opinion (inaudible).

GLADIN: [03:00] All right. Keep in mind that -- OK. OK.

BAYOR: What's --

GLADIN: You're going to have to work with me. When I got away in '59, I cut the city off. So I've been thinking something entirely different about seven years now, so.

BAYOR: I understand.

GLADIN: There's (inaudible).

BAYOR: Well, whatever [you turn up?].

GLADIN: OK, yeah, yeah.

BAYOR: On the building of the stadium. What I heard is that Mayor Allen had planned to put some white projects with the stadium (inaudible). The black leaders protested. They didn't want a white project there. The housing was to be (inaudible) they

wanted it for blacks. Business leaders didn't want a black project on the edge of the CBD. Allen was caught in a [public blunder?] and therefore decided that stadium (inaudible). What are your memories on that?

GLADIN: I don't believe it was all that. I'm sure some of that must have been -- I think [04:00] it was more Allen's close ties with the business community, and wanting a national league team here. At that time, Atlanta was taking advantage of -- and doing a very good job -- of getting every federal dollar it could get flowing in the direction. Every program that the federal government [ginned?] up up there, Atlanta tried to take advantage of it. So we had gone through a process of building freeways, and eliminating slum areas, and big on urban renewal, big on public housing, [replacement?] [05:00] housing. That represented some vacant land close to the central business district with freeway access. I think it was as much getting a catalyst close to the central business district that would grow a business. I think he had -- I would have bet he would have been more [oriented?] to the business aspect of it than -- and never really thought about -- even though he was involved in (inaudible) at one time, I don't believe that was something that was foremost in his mind. Except as it came from the business community. What's good for the business [06:00] community.

BAYOR: But there was no sense that you saw that he (inaudible) first, and then protest (inaudible)?

GLADIN: They were no white projects being proposed or thought of in that -- that was basically the residential area of the early 1900s up until World War II. After World War II is when Atlanta kind of started to bloom, and whites started to move out following job opportunities, leaving that old residential area. Slum lords [07:00] took advantage of that. They weren't slum lords when they began, but they ended up slum lords, just rotating a large number of families through houses that were designed for one or two families, and just sucked it dry, really. Then it was just cleared out. So you had chunks, large chunks, of land that could have been -- I'm sure there was a lot of concern about the number of public housing units that were being built in Atlanta about that time. There could have been concern about just continually adding large housing projects that close to the central business district. [08:00]

BAYOR: Was there any sense of --

GLADIN: But it wasn't -- you know, I think it was -- that was when we were already probably at a time we already had the largest public housing program in the country. If you look at how that public housing is located, there was a lot of concern about building another public housing project of 6,000 units.

[background conversation]

BAYOR: Was there any sense of the stadium or the (inaudible) as the buffers or as a way of removing blacks from the downtown area? [09:00] I know there's an economic aspect to this, but was

there a racial aspect?

GLADIN: I'm sure that -- I don't know. Other than they were just building public housing, and the fact that the black low-income family was the major tenant of the public housing, I don't -- (inaudible) was completely surrounded. (inaudible) was completely surrounded by the black community at that point anyway. So I don't -- I just don't -- and Allen, I don't know what you've heard, but I don't think he [10:00] had that strong of racial bias. I'm sure that the influence of the business community, and their concern about the market drying up downtown, and they were designed to service the white middle-class, and white middle-class had gone, and people like [Riches?] and so forth, they were really struggling. It hadn't been [me?] as part of that point, that they were able to refuse -- they were going to stay just where they were. They weren't going to shopping centers. That made a point. Stay downtown. [11:00] Of course, activated -- started out they saw -- they show (inaudible) staying downtown.

BAYOR: But most of the public outlook on the west side, that indicates some type of shift in that relation. I know there were complaints in the black community about all the housing being built on the west side (inaudible).

GLADIN: Yeah. Finding large chunks of land. Of course, you just... There were also this thing of [12:00] any apartments. Atlanta was basically the single-family -- thought of as the

single-family type of thing. Those are the (inaudible). I didn't care where you applied to put an apartment unit. You put the connotation of low-income apartment unit, and you really had yourself a fight on your hands. You got a bigger jar out of that than you will out of trying to run one of those freeways around. Of course, that was a lot of (inaudible) too, [of adding?] a freeway.

BAYOR: (inaudible) One of the things Leon Eplan said to me was that streets terminated in Atlanta that (inaudible) black and white neighborhoods. There were a few [continuous?] streets in the city. [13:00] That (inaudible). For example, he mentioned the dead-ending of termination of [Willis Road?] (inaudible) south of (inaudible). But then blacks would expand themselves in the Cascade area (inaudible). [Borden came out?] a little bit, then I think the dead ends around the Westview Cemetery was nothing for a long time, and it (inaudible). Any feeling that that was an attempt to prevent blacks from having continuous roads coming back from the Cascade area?

GLADIN: Well. It wasn't Willis Mill, but it's that Willis Mill corridor, I guess. Peyton Road was the big -- where the big barrier was put in the wall and so forth. [14:00] But the Willis Mill, Willis Mill was a north-south route back Civil War days, and it never -- there was a tie in there at one time. But other than the Peyton Road blockading, that was the only effort that was ever made to -- using a roadway, blocking a roadway.

Just Willis Mill, it was -- they're right, there's no north-south movement on the west side of the city now, except for 285. You can't find any north-south streets. (inaudible) continues.

BAYOR: (inaudible) [15:00] Was it intent to block black expansion, you think?

GLADIN: If it was, it was done back in the early 1900s. It could have very well been. But it certainly wasn't done -- other words, that was pre-Hartsfield time. Or it could have been -- you used to hear a lot about Hartsfield and his deal.

BAYOR: Oh, yes.

GLADIN: And trades with the black community and so forth. And that might have been a part of some of that.

BAYOR: Any use of I-20 (inaudible)?

GLADIN: I don't think so. I think, again, the [16:00] -- you had a strong economic pull, and getting highways to crisscross through the city, somebody thought, back at the tail end of World War II, that that was the thing. You know, that was going to be the transportation hub there. And that -- they may have been foresighted enough to see that they were clogging up the city and saying to the white community, "This is yours, and this is yours." The black community had this.

BAYOR: (inaudible) seem to be happening.

GLADIN: That was before my time. That was something that was done way back. And it's hard to conceive [17:00] that anybody had that kind of foresight of the potential of Atlanta at that time.

I just -- the airport wasn't working, and the transportation hub -- we were a railroad hub, but I just -- and dealing with those people, that was dumb luck, or dumb -- they stumbled into -- I just don't think that there was that kind of a foresight, and I've worked with a lot of the business community and the political entity, state and local, [18:00] all through the '60s and the '70s when all of this really [boomed?]. They didn't -- these guys didn't -- they didn't have that kind of crystal ball, and they just -- every time we turned around, we were overrun, because nobody anticipated the growth. We'd say, "It's going to triple," and it would quadruple.

BAYOR: Wasn't expecting this.

GLADIN: I've always had a hard time just seeing even Hartsfield sitting down with the black and white community and carving the city up, but they [said?] that was done.

BAYOR: Well, it seems to (inaudible). How about the use of access roads, railroad spurs, public (inaudible). [19:00] Any information on that at all? Any (inaudible)?

GLADIN: I don't think so. Let's put it this way. I know it wasn't open policy. Naturally it wouldn't be. But as a department head working in that, there was nothing that was deliberate or intentional along those lines. I don't care what people feel or think. It was not set down in any master scheme or plot.

BAYOR: This isn't necessarily racism. A lot of times, it was seen as a way of having the whites in the community accept blacks

coming in by creating [20:00] some sort of buffer. Otherwise, it would have been totally [a black community?].

GLADIN: Yeah. The buffers were established way back. But -- and I'm -- way back being early 1900s. I think there was more done openly and in those timeframes, in the '20s and so forth, that that carried over, and the fact that there was no roads in a particular area, and there was just no movement in that particular area. Public housing in the '60s, it was where you could get to turn things on. It was where [21:00] somebody had -- people would come. They would be wanting -- they would really beg to see -- to put them in an urban renewal project. And the urban renewal project then would turn out clearing large areas. When we cleared large areas, that represented about the only place that you could get the public to agree to zone the land [for put housing in?].

BAYOR: Maybe a lot were involved (inaudible) Hartsfield (inaudible) the Hartsfield administration [changed?]. I think the Joe (inaudible) project was white initially, placed on a certain point near Westview Drive as sort of the dividing line (inaudible). [22:00] Let me mention a thing that comes during your period that I came across. Quite a few of the Bureau of Planning (inaudible) and the Atlanta Historical Society -- came across a report. It's called "Report on the (inaudible) Transition Period in 1960." It reads like this. "Just approximately two to three years ago, there was an understanding

that (inaudible) would be the boundary line between white and Negro communities. (inaudible) has been seen as an effort to stabilize the area. The highway is marked out for an intersection (inaudible). Black builders were refused permission to build low-to-moderate-income housing south of the (inaudible) highway, and were refused on the basis [what stated?] city complications (inaudible)." [Probably there?], and that's Bureau of Planning report, that a road -- I guess I-20 -- was laid out in an [23:00] area with the expressed (inaudible) of blacks on one side, whites on the other. (inaudible) That's where a lot of these questions -- you can see that -- here was a document. (inaudible) The actual deal was apparently cut two to three years before 1960, so it's really you weren't in the...

GLADIN: Adamsville... Well.

BAYOR: (inaudible)

GLADIN: Yeah. I don't -- I remember that report, but I sure don't remember that language. (inaudible) Did you have -- let me (inaudible). Did you go get into the old (inaudible) highway (inaudible)? Did that have any...

BAYOR: Any of this material?

GLADIN: Any of that type of material?

BAYOR: Probably these were pretty much worked out after (inaudible).

GLADIN: But I think (inaudible) was more of justification. In

other words, I don't know that the freeway was put there as a barrier, but it could have very well been a line. And they said, "OK, we'll use it as a barrier type of a thing." They had come in the back door.

BAYOR: [25:00] And they were building this highway anyway. Let's build it a certain way, where it can serve as a barrier. Now, I think the [Hartsfield entries?] have shown the [slightest?] (inaudible) way of giving the black community the land without the whites objecting. So it's not particularly racism.

GLADIN: Yeah. It was access into an area. But I... I don't recall any points at which zoning was denied or building permits were denied because -- on a racial basis like that.

BAYOR: This is not the first one I came across. There was one in which [26:00] black builders were allowed to build only to, I think, 100 yards of Westview Drive. (inaudible)

GLADIN: Yeah, around that Westview Cemetery, Peyton Road, that was -- there must have been something real strong at that particular point to pull Allen into that trap that he got into, because we were begging him not to -- just a no-win type of situation. It was -- I never really knew who he was so indebted to, or (inaudible) [27:00] to follow through on that particular [stand?].

BAYOR: (inaudible)

GLADIN: He was not the type -- that was just totally out of character.

BAYOR: (inaudible) In regard to that, what I've been told also is that, apparently after the Peyton wall is in in '62, an agreement was reached between white and black leaders behind the scenes, that the blacks would not be imposed to any more moving into [only?] southwest. The area would shift racially (inaudible) and the blacks could move in these directions (inaudible) expansion. This was not told to the white community, but apparently Allen was not going to make any more attempts to restrict blacks (inaudible). I guess he was embarrassed enough by the Peyton wall. All these restrictions were now removed. That area is slated [28:00] the black expansion. The (inaudible) were expendable.

GLADIN: I think -- I don't think anybody had an idea that the black community had the economic buying power that they had. I think they felt that that was going to be a movement that they would accept, but they thought it was coming at a much slower pace. It moved through areas in the then [50, 60, 75?], which was an economic range that the black community didn't have a strong buying power. [29:00] I think that that caught a lot of the white community by surprise over in this particular area. But it moved around much faster. It didn't move kind of as a wave. It's a typical type of black/white conflict movement type of a situation.

BAYOR: Apparently (inaudible) the barriers that had been set by the Hartsfield administration. And, according to this at least,

Allen just gave up after the Peyton wall. Didn't want to get involved in that type of restriction, and opened up the area to blacks. Thing is, he didn't tell the whites about it. It was a secret, behind-the-scenes agreement. [30:00] I guess my feeling is that the whites here were quickly expendable. They weren't Allen supporters anyway. He was getting his votes from the blacks and from the west side whites. This was [let go?].

GLADIN: Could have been. Could have been. I think you could be naïve enough to -- not to be naïve enough to think that he had no agreements whatsoever. He had been pushed into a situation of putting up a barrier against his better judgment. [31:00] He said, "Look, the economic -- let there be no barriers," that never thought in terms of white expenditure or black -- trade-offs and this kind of thing.

BAYOR: Most of what I'm hearing about this is coming from the black community, people I've spoken to in the black community. It's not something that Allen [particularly admits?]. It's really (inaudible).

GLADIN: The black community likes to think that they were winning battles, and there was black leadership that were claiming a lot of things that they had concession. There was no such thing. [32:00]

BAYOR: [What were they winning?]?

GLADIN: It was a natural process. The resistance had been relieved. The market was there, and it moved.

BAYOR: So you think it would have happened no matter what Allen
(inaudible)?

GLADIN: Yeah. And I think it would have happened regardless of
what some black leaders might have been claiming. They were
thumping their chest [at any kind of win?]. To be able to go
back to that group and say, "I've got this type of concession:
we now have this area, we've been promised this area" was a way
of thumping their chest and floating to the top of the [pile?].
I bet it was more that than it was [33:00] -- and just a normal
expansion and a normal -- it was just a release. If there
was... It's hard to... Economics sometimes held, and many
times held, more influence on roads and directions of roads than
public policy. There's some stupid public policy. It's just
not very enlightened sometimes. I was amazed at the business
community, how they made decisions in many [34:00] instances.
You would think that they had grand plans and thoughts, and a
lot of times it was just because, oh, Joe just built a 40-story;
I'm going to build me a 42.

BAYOR: (inaudible) This is a story I'm trying to sort of set out
the truth for all this. It's really hard to deal with a lot of
this, because it's not written down, behind the scenes, and I'm
relying on the word of other people who were at those meetings
(inaudible) decisions being made (inaudible).

GLADIN: There's one department head that had the ear of the mayor
during those particular years. There was just all of this

plotting. [35:00] (background conversation) The strategy and plotting and so forth never came through [governmental stage?].

BAYOR: If anything was done that you didn't know about, it was done on the mayor's level with the business leaders?

GLADIN: Yeah. They had to do it somewhere, on a golf course or in a meeting or something like this. The point being, it was just me talking to you type of a thing, and agreeing. And I can't conceive that that would have any impact on how the general growth pattern and push was going. I just... Other than the black community saying, "OK, [36:00] we can go into this area," and they focused their attention on that particular area. I think that, to a large degree, private enterprise -- even today, when you came into town and plot to buy your home and went to a real estate guy, he sure didn't show you South Atlanta. If you were going to be [up here?] (inaudible) he showed you (inaudible), North Atlanta. And they've been doing this for a long time.

BAYOR: They've been directing the racism (inaudible).

GLADIN: Right, right. But to find a political strategy, [37:00] it wasn't there. [To find?].

BAYOR: (inaudible) real report --

GLADIN: I know it, I know it.

BAYOR: And that seems to suggest that the blacks couldn't move into [those neighborhoods?]. There were political dealings restricting them. Maybe that's what (inaudible) referring to by

saying, "Now the area is open. No more [dealings?]." That's what I was going to get back to.

GLADIN: But you're going to have to go back -- you're going to have to -- we're not talking about '60, '70. We're talking about anywhere from '30s to the '50s. It could have been more in a narrower period of time. It could have been more in the mid-'40s to early '50s, that five-year time [38:00] following World War II.

BAYOR: There was a big need for black expansion.

GLADIN: That's right. Things were happening there, and that could have -- by focusing your attention counter to that -- maybe it could have happened in a five-year period of time there.

BAYOR: Yeah, but I think the Hartsfield administration was probably more involved. Another thing I was looking at was the High Point development on [Carver Road?].

GLADIN: (inaudible)

BAYOR: What I had heard, that the problem here was that the [opposed?] express highway, which I guess is (inaudible), was pushed westward from its original position as opposed to (inaudible) pushed westward. It was shifted [39:00] away from its original position by (inaudible) for the High Point project by the pressure by white (inaudible). Blacks went to Washington complaining about the highway shift (inaudible) so that the High Point development could be built. Any remembrances about that? That may have been late 1940s.

GLADIN: Yeah, that was (inaudible). In fact, I was on a -- I was in college at that particular point, on a surveying team. In fact, I led a surveying team that located many of the buildings [that got developed?].

BAYOR: Apparently, from what I gather, the road was supposed to go around it at first, and then it was shifted to go through the project, so as to kill the project. Then because the blacks complained to Washington, it was shifted back to --

GLADIN: Shifted back to --

BAYOR: Where it is now. That's the type of thing I'm [40:00] looking for, too. Just how --

GLADIN: Well, OK. Knowing the engineer that did it -- not the engineer, but engineers in general -- they took (inaudible) and they're trying to relieve that curve right now.

BAYOR: That's true. (inaudible) in the first place.

GLADIN: Yeah, yeah. I'll bet you that, knowingly, the engineer at that particular point, I mean, they were really kind of raining down. They put it the best alignment, design alignment, that they could come up with. Again, it was saw as a racial move, and probably some little turkey on the drawing table had made a straight line and somebody didn't [41:00] pick it up until it was too late. And then they hollered that it was a racial issue. It [let the appearance?] and it was shifted alignment around that particular area, which is bad engineering, and which (inaudible). I know I must be sounding like I'm anti -- or

trying to fight any of these racial issues, but I was never approached, never -- and that really amazed me through a lot of this, really. I guess it's why it stuck so tight, is how no one ever pressured me, no one ever -- you know, on a zoning, on anything, had anything to do with something like that. They just did not -- that was just [42:00] taboo. If it was done, it was done some other area, and it was other reasons. Just like this engineering thing, you know. You would be openly trying to do something right, and only have it twisted. You'd go, how did they get that out of it? It was just a lot of that, where the black/white politician type, or black/white community leader was searching for any action, anything, that could be cast in a racial tone. That was kind of the early '60s. [43:00] And you'd be standing there -- how did they draw that conclusion? It looked like a major plot that some community is working away, trying to do it right, and you may have -- we may have been guilty of not being super sensitive to certain things at first, and planning it following good planning and good engineering characteristics or parameters for drawing up using a technical -- and not thinking about the human effect.

BAYOR: I also came across something on the east-west rail line, that it was developed first, east-west, (inaudible) this part of the black community [for the barn issue?], [44:00] even though, Collier, there was a study that indicated the east-west could be served by a bus far more economically. [It looks out?] the rail

line was really more (inaudible). And that basically was [in support of?] the black community then.

GLADIN: Yeah. Yeah. That -- now, that was going on, and it was going on parallel to, again, engineering types of criteria and cost, money [projects?]. When those two balanced out, it happened. But that was a concession. It made a concession to two things: the black community and [45:00] DeKalb County to get that east-west. In other words, to get the two counties there to support it. DeKalb County would not support a north-south line initially, even though that was where it should have been built. But -- and to get DeKalb County concession and support and the black community support -- but also, it had a (inaudible) alignment. Because it was -- we just brought it under the city at that particular point, and you could build that line cheaper, and you could get that line -- you could actually sell it, [46:00] the east part of it, just following a straight line, as your test drive, or your test section. So engineering-wise, cost and the strategy for building the system, and the -- that's not right. That's not right. That was there, but I don't think the timing of that was -- in other words, the timing of the election was before the engineering -- I mean, they knew those things and they were selling it on that particular basis. But the stronger rationale for building that east-west line was the political support.

BAYOR: From the black community?

GLADIN: And DeKalb County. [47:00] I don't think the black community thing was just part of it. Getting DeKalb County -- you would have not gotten DeKalb County without it.

BAYOR: Well, you probably wouldn't have gotten the black community without -- if you had built a north-south line instead, I bet they would have [voted it down?].

GLADIN: I don't know.

BAYOR: Well, that's what it seems to me. It seems that they wanted something to share with the black community (inaudible).

GLADIN: Of the '60s and the '70s, I imagine that was as good an example of a concession totally to the black community. [You could scratch around and find people?].

BAYOR: That was the promise made also. Since you were involved with Allen, Massell, and (inaudible) did you see any changes at all in dealing with racial-related issues [48:00] that either one of the administrations (inaudible)?

GLADIN: I think it was more -- as far as planning was concerned, it was more a period of time of doing some planning. Of moving from just a process of zoning into transportation and housing, and really doing some -- and to do planning, we had to involve people, and I think, with a large urban renewal program that we had during the '60s, we learned the need for citizen involvement. There was more and more involvement built into the planning process. First, it was urban renewal, [49:00] and then model cities, and then it was neighborhoods and city-wide. You

got more involvement of the people as we went through these process. More people knew what was going on, and knew why, and they were in there debating their project over somebody else's project type of thing, or debating why they didn't want something in their backyard that somebody else had it.

BAYOR: Is that probably the pressure from the federal government to get people involved in the planning process?

GLADIN: Initially. Initially, in the urban renewal part of it. But after we got into that and had some experience with that, the involvement of people in the planning process, [50:00] and a lot of that grew, after the urban renewal and the model citizen thing, grew out of highway. The north-south freeway, 485 thing on the east side. Large planning and engineering types of projects that started -- the public started to see this is shaping the city. Where are we going to live type of thing. That greater involvement, people knew exactly what was coming down, all the way around. Up until they really got into it, they were not involved. They saw such a small -- that's why I have a hard time conceiving somebody sitting back with some super master plan and carving up the city, because it just [51:00] -- nobody thought in those terms. And we were not unique. American cities -- I don't believe there was that -- we were doing as much as anybody else was.

BAYOR: So have you come across a [part?] in late 1940s, Hartsfield's administration, that the blacks have opposed six

areas that they were going to expand? And they actually did write it out, and there was one that was accepted by Hartsfield. (inaudible) There actually was a plan. (inaudible) Did you see any more attention paid to the south side of (inaudible)?

GLADIN: I think [52:00] I saw more [conflict?] from Jackson to work to get the black politicians and to get the black more heavily involved in all phases, every city department. So to that extent, I think that it may have been more, because you were dealing more with blacks in charge of -- and making decisions and recommendations, and their recommendations may have been strongly to the southwest. [53:00] The reason -- we had moved through a phase where bond issues were just taboo. You couldn't pass a bond. And without those bond issues, there were no major projects being built. You know, in quadrants where they were -- you had an opportunity of saying, "We're going to have a bond issue, and this is the project, and you're getting a piece of the pie, and you're getting a piece of pie." That was in the Allen administration, early thing, trying to get things spread around. But your services, I'm sure that the services were probably improved in the black community. But [54:00] I think it was -- I really think improvements were made city-wide, and by making them city-wide, they improved in areas that had been -- where preference may have been given earlier, and made everything kind of equal. And to the point -- the effort of making it equal city-wide, it improved everybody type of thing,

or improved areas, some areas, more than others.

BAYOR: (inaudible) must have gone through a transition, I'm sure.

GLADIN: Oh, yeah. Yeah.

BAYOR: Were any white families living there at all?

GLADIN: Oh, yeah. Yeah. (inaudible) still probably 30%.

BAYOR: This is really one of the few.

GLADIN: This area would probably be the [55:00] -- it's going to have its time. It will have its people coming back in and renovating, because it just offers an awful great opportunity. We just kind of stuck it out. I've never had any problems whatsoever here.

BAYOR: How long have you been here?

GLADIN: Oh, about 25 years.

BAYOR: You were here during times (inaudible)?

GLADIN: Oh, yeah. Yeah. The main thing that happened is the change in your schools. But even -- it went further than that. All your friends kind of -- the families, the church ties, all left and the church froze up, type [56:00] thing like that.

BAYOR: Did the public schools deteriorate at all (inaudible)?

GLADIN: Yeah, I think so.

BAYOR: (inaudible)

GLADIN: I think... The schools... Shifted our children out into the private school (inaudible). That was one of the reasons we stayed here. No sense in moving from this particular area. I wanted to stay any city. I knew what was happening city-wide,

and it made no sense to me whatsoever to try to run.

BAYOR: Well, as long as you had the school problem (inaudible).

[57:00] Did you find the city making any effort at all to save this area? Save it as an integrated area? (inaudible) No help whatsoever? No infusion of money at the schools to make them satisfying to whites or... In other words, you're on your own?

GLADIN: Yes, it was just -- everybody just kind of [grabbed?].

BAYOR: That's what I mean before when I said that maybe Allen just said, "Well, the area is open." (inaudible) But the whites, this is it. It's your area, and the black community. Take what you can get.

GLADIN: Yeah. I don't think they were -- again, it was -- the services were put out on a city-wide basis. The schools were just going downhill anyway type of a thing. It wasn't just this particular [58:00] area. All the schools were just in big trouble. I don't think that they could have -- I don't believe there would have been anything that they could have done to single out an area and say, "OK, we're going to do this particular area up." No one in the schools were even willing to say that there were any problems at that particular time.

BAYOR: I came across an organization called Southwest Alliance (inaudible), and they apparently were petitioning the Board of Education to improve the schools in that particular period, and they were getting (inaudible). And then finally (inaudible).

GLADIN: Yeah, the schools probably had -- that was -- seems like

the magic point was about 40%, and when it hit, the area just changed overnight. [59:00] Those white families had just stopped to think -- other words, just because it was a black family moving in, they had their minds -- they were thinking in terms of black families being low-income. That's what they'd come in contact with, low-income, I guess. They never stopped to think that the black family in the same income range, economic range, (inaudible). Just not that different.

BAYOR: (inaudible)

GLADIN: Yeah.

BAYOR: It's an interesting community to have that mix. It's very unusual to see.

GLADIN: We've had some [01:00:00] extremely good neighbors.

Couldn't be more helpful. Much more helpful than any white neighbor. I had [Jack Summer?] over on one side. He was a councilman for years and years and years.

BAYOR: (inaudible)

GLADIN: Well, not really. Not really. I've got Dr. [Green?], who was head of Morehouse Medical School. We worked together, and better than Jack and I ever (inaudible).

BAYOR: Are there any other people that (inaudible) might know about that period? Not even sure who's still around anymore, really. (inaudible) [Jim Parto?].

GLADIN: [Parm?].

BAYOR: Parm?

GLADIN: [01:01:00] Yeah.

BAYOR: I don't know if he's...

GLADIN: I don't know where Jim is.

BAYOR: A few people who seem to be involved in policy decisions
(inaudible).

GLADIN: Yeah. Jim... I haven't heard from him in years. He did
some things on a grassroots level that -- and got to be known.
He did a great job in the (inaudible) area. Just one man. No
backing, no support, but just got in and did more. A lot of the
governmental actions, they were just pumping a lot of money in a
lot of directions. Not too wise. The urban renewal program
[was a doozy?], I'll tell you.

BAYOR: [01:02:00] [That didn't work?].

GLADIN: It was -- so many of those things, the strategy was go
after the federal dollar, because you couldn't have the local
dollar. Those programs were -- so many of them were so in-
conceived. There was no way for them to work. No way.

BAYOR: (inaudible)

GLADIN: Someone else that would... I was -- I got into city
government. I was the young kid, and I got a department --
[01:03:00] I was the youngest department head (inaudible). You
pretty well had to be about 50 or 60 before you ever got a shot
in the department there, that timeframe, and I got in when I was
about 35. A lot of these people that were involved in this
stuff are just long gone.

BAYOR: Actually, I think you and Eplan are the two youngest people I've interviewed, actually. (inaudible) people were involved in that period.

GLADIN: Much older. Some guy that -- one fellow that might be interesting to talk to -- have you talked with Charles Davis?

BAYOR: Who is he?

GLADIN: He was the finance [01:04:00] director of the city of Atlanta during the same timeframe that I was there. Very powerful individual. He grew up under -- he kind of came in at the tail end of Hartsfield. He would have a little different viewpoint, I think. He would have a viewpoint of where the money was going.

BAYOR: It's really hard to get people who are going back to the Hartsfield administration. [01:05:00] (inaudible)

GLADIN: Yeah. See, all of his department people, or heads, were in the '60s. Charles Davis was just a [few years older than I?]. Charles and myself. We were about the only two there. We were just -- we really had to fight and scratch, I'll tell you. Charles had the money stream, and so he had some real control. And actually, during a lot of this earlier phase, was doing -- having more say-so over the planning than planners were having.

BAYOR: Must have been the money.

GLADIN: That's right. And that was the big effort. I wonder if I [better?] [01:06:00] would share this, but main things that I got done, really, was to get that charter -- [not even?] get it

done, but I was there, and one of the people that were really pushing for a charter, and to get the budgeting. Some relationship between budgeting and [finance?].

BAYOR: Makes sense. [It was the people that were splitting it out?].

GLADIN: Yeah. They slid backwards. At least things were tied down. In many instances, [more that?] got tied down. Every one of those transit stations are designed and tied down. The zoning order was written that will guide and accept the type of [01:07:00] development that you could pull around those transit stations. And it's extremely hard for somebody to screw it up. It's one of those things that happened way back yonder way. Just changing administration is not going to change the government moving along.

BAYOR: Doesn't do it on a national level, so I guess not.

GLADIN: But Charles was involved, very much involved, with Allen and money and expenditures and the stadium and urban renewal, early phases of that.

BAYOR: And he's (inaudible)?

GLADIN: Yeah. I don't know -- now... [01:08:00] But you can (inaudible) check with the finance -- Commission of Finance right now. He knows where Charles is, I'm sure.

BAYOR: Or his telephone number.

GLADIN: Yeah, yeah. He may have moved. He may be 30 miles away or something like that, but he's still fairly close. He had some

land. They may have moved out on the farm, or moved to the lake around there, something like that. Thank you. Enjoyed talking.

BAYOR: (inaudible) This has actually been the best part of the study, just meeting a lot of people who were involved in this period. (inaudible) 20 interviews (inaudible).

GLADIN: Well, if you find -- obviously, you go through the archives, [01:09:00] and you've got a great deal of information.

BAYOR: The archives have been mostly for -- the Hartsfield papers are available. Then it will be all the Bureau of Planning material is at the --

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