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Interviewer: Bayor, Ronald H.
Interviewee: Eplan, Leon S.
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RONALD BAYOR: [00:00:00] One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten.

(break in audio)

LEON EPLAN: What do you teach today?

BAYOR: I teach urban history, my field.

EPLAN: That's fine. I do remember hearing about you, because I introduced a history course into the curriculum. The core, the [correct core?], and I think that's now been balanced. I don't know, maybe it has been balance, but I when redo -- when I came in, I decided that we needed to redo the curriculum. And there were two things I wanted in there: I wanted an urban history course, and I wanted an urban design course. And Andrew [Sowicki?], who was really much more of a numbers guy, he really didn't have an interest in those kinds of things. And so I think that that's a big loss, but your name was mentioned because someone in my -- there were four that we -- the first time we went around, however, [00:01:00] (inaudible). But I knew it back here. In fact, I had not made the association

until just now, about you, and I heard that you did a very fine job with it, in the architecture program.

BAYOR: Oh, thank you. I was trying to (inaudible) a post in city planning for a while, but now Will and I can never seem to (inaudible), we just -- he's was very poor organizer --

EPLAN: See, I wondered, I thought at the time, that there were -- that that course ought to have three dimensions. One, you need an understanding of history, and for a historian, it needed someone from -- what was it, three areas, someone -- the urban architectural development, and the third area was someone -- there was another, it was a third -- three dimensions to the (inaudible) history, or the course, but the three I thought -- and urban [00:02:00] (inaudible) -- and the history was the most important thing, and somebody -- an historian, (inaudible) views history.

BAYOR: I wanted to do it.

EPLAN: Well, certainly, we talked it through, because certainly I happened -- just happened to know Tim, because I was an urban design commission, from the -- and so I just kind of turned to him, but --

(overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

BAYOR: Maybe sometime in the future, perhaps.

EPLAN: I don’t know, I really -- my ties are beginning to fade, I’m afraid. I’m sorry, because (inaudible) all people with [practice occurrence?]. And Malcolm is gone, and John is gone, and --

BAYOR: I remember [Stanley Goodyear?], and then, yeah.

EPLAN: He’s a good guy. (inaudible), only because [the extreme?] (inaudible). I had a different understanding of planning the program, (inaudible). It’s a hotly-debated issue. We’re not [00:03:00] -- I sit on the National Accreditation Board, and we debate that, really. I debate with the recommendations a great deal.

(overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

EPLAN: What would you like to know?

BAYOR: [Aterpo’s?] 1968 speech, of your -- I think it was in the -- in Cecil Alexander’s files, who gave me access to this material. And you had said something like “Streets were terminated as they passed from black neighborhoods to white ones. A map of Atlanta will show how few continuous streets traverse the urban community.” And I was curious about that statement.

EPLAN: Well, that happened in West End when the (inaudible). It happened in -- to some extent in -- well, to some extent -- the whole east-west movement, the expressway which is a major -- such a big -- a big facility, [00:04:00]

effectively created a barrier, it’s like a wall in concrete (inaudible), otherwise you (inaudible).

(break in audio)

EPLAN: The expressway was different to the other streets.

BAYOR: Was the expressway --

EPLAN: Of course, yeah. The expressway was more like an ancient wall, through which you have portals. And so they had become much more effective barriers between communications and the city.

BAYOR: Were the expressways built with that in mind?

EPLAN: Oh, no.

BAYOR: Were they located in certain areas?

EPLAN: No, oh, you mean, where they actually were laid? I think that the answer was I think it was probably partly so, partly -- they had -- in the first place, they had directions they had to go. And so once they had a general corridor, the question is specifically where they designed the road. I think when you it down to specifics, [00:05:00] they tended to put it through slum areas. And those slum areas were particularly occupied by blacks. So the final difference was that it effectively separated the black community from the white community. But I’m not sure that I could say that it was motivated by racial -- by racial overtones --

BAYOR: OK, I've come across your planning materials from back in the '50s, which indicated they were putting access roads for a meandering highway specifically to serve as buffers and roads between white and black communities.

EPLAN: Actually, I've heard this argument made many times, and I wasn't privy to the final design decisions. They were done -- they were primarily done by the city and by the state, you know, in concert. My guess would be, though -- and again, it would be [00:06:00] only a guess -- is that it was less that and the ability to wipe out some slums. That certainly true in Techwood (inaudible). Because I remember that area very well, I went to junior high at O'Keefe, which was then a junior high, and it became a high school later. And I remember that the whole Techwood and [Wheaton?] Street corridor, which was a very, very heavy slum area, and I remember in 1946 when they began to build -- to clear out that area, and it was a slum clearance project. The fact that it was occupied by blacks was secondary, and it certainly was -- it meant that there wasn't a lot of resistance as well. They knew the blacks wouldn't give a lot of resistance, so you just didn't hear black -- blacks were -- whites weren't organized either. In fact, whites were less organized. People understand that the blacks [00:07:00] had articulate (inaudible)

leadership in the slum community, where -- the four areas where whites do not have articulate leadership, because any articulate white can rise, and they are -- and the blacks at that time couldn't rise. So you kind of kept pretty good leadership within the slum areas of black communities. So if it went through a white area, there wouldn't be that great a protest. They were workers. They were inarticulate. They were not organized all the same way, and so forth. Whereas you have in the black community (inaudible). Nonetheless, it came down where -- at least in the Wheaton Street area, that was the black area. I remember -- I'm probably one of the few people that you'll talk to -- probably the few people remember -- but I remember that the homes were built, because I was in the fourth grade at the time, and my mother pushing [00:08:00] -- upward mobile person she was, sent me to an enrichment program during the summer of my fourth year in school. It was at Druid Hills High. And it was called an experimental program. And what it was, she'd drop me off every day, and they'd take me -- they'd take us out to look at the city. I had the feeling that may have been the genesis of my interest in cities. But I remember -- the only memory I have, in fact -- was we went over to look at they're tearing down the slums and they'll put up public housing.

And so this was in 1936, when they -- and I remember them tearing down the slums, and building the public housing. And there was a great amount of excitement about, they're going to put these people in nice houses, and so forth.

BAYOR: (inaudible).

EPLAN: That's right. Interesting enough, this is a diversion -- this is known as the first public housing project (inaudible). Actually, [00:09:00] that's not exactly true. It's correct because there were two [projects?] built at the same time. There's the University Homes on the south end, and called this first, and not the -- why I call that first.

BAYOR: Well, I guess this one was built, actually, first, but I guess Techwood was the first to open.

EPLAN: Yeah, it would be interesting, but if you look at the design and the materials, that was built out of concrete block, it was built out of brick. The white one--

BAYOR: Was built out of brick.

EPLAN: Yeah. The Techwood Homes were brick.

BAYOR: And the other one was cheaper.

EPLAN: Yeah, and it was concrete block.

BAYOR: So they did give the blacks less of an incentive.

EPLAN: Absolutely. And the densities are higher. You'll find a nice courtyard, this a nice design. You look at the design of University Homes, built at the same time.

BAYOR: Even then.

EPLAN: In other words, a diversion, but that -- I cannot tell you, because I wasn't privy to the (inaudible). All I can tell you is that I do know that they headed towards [00:10:00] -- that we were in a slum clearance mentality, and it was very easy to take over and occupy poor housing; it was doing the city a favor to get rid of this bad housing. And it was. The slum housing they had then was not -- was much, much worse than the slum housing we know now. Slums are better than they used to be. And so they were non-salvageable. They were overcrowded. There were outside privies. There were no paved streets. And so it was a favor to clear up the slums. The fact that they happened to be black too, overwhelmingly black --

BAYOR: So in a sense, then, I guess, returning to what you were saying before, that we do have a situation in Atlanta where you have very continuing streets, (inaudible) streets. Mozley Drive, for example, Parkway Drive, (inaudible), where the names change, or they cut at a certain point to block off white and black communities.

EPLAN: Well, that particular street, and Boulevard, and Monroe Drive [00:11:00] was an interesting story because we changed names of streets. Are you aware of the fact that that Boulevard changed names three times?

BAYOR: I think that was from (inaudible).

EPLAN: Because that went from white to black, and then to white, it became Jackson Street, and went back into Boulevard as it reemerged in Grant Park, and back when we had Monroe Drive over here. But -- I can show you on a map where the streets were separated. But Atlanta has always been segmented because of the railroads. If you crossed over the -- when I began to do the planning on MARTA, I wanted to make certain that we actually re -- see, MARTA -- the thing is that even with the railroads, we were able to cross the grade all through the city. It was a barrier, and it was the barrier that was increased because you had industrial development alongside the railroad. [00:12:00] So then you had -- so you had the railroad, the industrial development, and then you had the community. So that the railroad became a barrier -- and plus the land that went around it -- that kept people from communicating north-south and east-west across it. But you could get across there. The very first -- one of the first things I observed when I began to plan the MARTA system in ’67 was

how -- I thought maybe it would be a good time to reconnect the city. So I began to run down the system to find ways, I think because -- and what happened -- because what was going to happen is that when they took up the track and put down MARTA, it had to be [tense?]. So it would for all time increase -- for all time create a barrier. And you had these five-minute headways on the trains. And so you had to -- so what I wanted to do, I said, you have to go on the course of building permanent underpasses [00:13:00] and bridges. Well, that was a great time to now -- to reconnect the city in a real sense. So I went through in my studies in ’70 -- in ’67, ’68, went through and identified three that I thought ought to be reconnected. Then we had to fight who was going to pay for all of that, and that became a big (inaudible). They didn’t mind doing that, it was just a little too -- who was responsible for paying for that extra cost of reconnecting? But it came down, MARTA picked up a lot of that expense, because they were creating the problem, and we had reconnection. So we were able to build the Arizona Street underpasses, a good example, which never existed before. So we would -- but there was -- but we’ve always -- I’m only slightly diverted -- a diversion. The city has always been segmented. Not just segmented by highways, but segmented by the railroads.

BAYOR: But also by race, I take it, in terms of how the highway (inaudible) [00:14:00].

EPLAN: Well, the --

BAYOR: Just getting back to your statement that -- the ’68 statement that streets were terminated that passed from black neighborhoods to white ones.

EPLAN: That’s right.

BAYOR: And very continuous -- very few continuous streets.

EPLAN: That’s correct.

BAYOR: And that’s basically sort of a racial thing.

EPLAN: I want to make certain that I really feel that it was a racial thing, because the statement I made is right, they were terminated, and I can show you all up on a map how -- exactly where that is. But whether or not it was a racial or whether or not it resulted in -- you know, whether the motivation was racial or whether it had a racial effect, now, see, are two different things, you know. And I don’t want to misstate that there was some kind of [00:15:00] racism operating here. It may have resulted in segregation, but whether or not the motivation was racist -- I suspect it was to some extent, my guess would be, but whether -- but I don’t think that was the prime motivation. I think the prime motivation was to get rid of the slums,

and to -- and the slums existed -- so they put it on the edges of the slums that exist, and resulted in segregation.

BAYOR: For the highways? (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

EPLAN: Highways. What had happened -- it happened in west end. It happened in -- between Grant Park or along Memorial Drive where I-20 passes through. And there was a pocket along Wheaton Street in Techwood, in front of O'Keefe, that pocket there, it was a long pocket [00:16:00] of black housing that was simply wiped out. So then they took -- they took that area, but that was the worst housing. They were looking for a way to do slum clearance and to buy houses that were cheap, and that type of thing.

BAYOR: So it's probably -- it was probably a slum clearance motivation, plus, I guess, a buffer mentality I suppose was at work, also, to some extent.

EPLAN: Well, I think the test would be, if that -- if there had been a slum area, and whites lived in here, whether they (inaudible). And I have to say that I suspect in that particular corridor, the Spring Street to Fort William Street corridor, I suspect they would have taken any -- I really think they would have taken any (inaudible), that the majority of housing [00:17:00] of slums were black, and so the majority of people displaced were black.

BAYOR: Now, it wasn't only in terms of the highways that, I think, (inaudible). You know, streets were terminated when they passed from black neighborhoods to white ones. I think (inaudible) at some point, just the end of the street, stopped, leaving no (inaudible) beyond that point.

EPLAN: I'm having -- the reason (inaudible) only is because I'm trying to think of some examples of that (inaudible).

BAYOR: (inaudible) maybe 20 years ago, what do I know?

BAYOR: I know, (inaudible) some nefarious form of discrim--

EPLAN: No, no. I think that -- exactly -- I think there was a -- there -- I'll tell you where I think I made that speech, and I think I've got a copy of the whole speech. There was a White House conference.

BAYOR: Yeah, I think I've seen a copy of the whole speech, actually.

EPLAN: Yeah. There was a White House conference [00:18:00] on housing discrimination. And Cecil Alexander was the chairman, and they brought in some people from Washington, and I was the keynote speaker. And that was the -- that came from that speech, I'm almost sure. (inaudible). Let's see, I have to look -- you live a long time, you don't move.

EPLAN: How long have you been living in this city?

BAYOR: Twelve years. (inaudible).

EPLAN: I will have to think about that, about -- when you were reading in that statement, the streets were terminated, this is -- has something to do with highways?

BAYOR: They were simply -- streets were terminated simply to keep white and black neighborhoods separated. Nothing to do with I-20 or, you know, just terminated streets. In other words, instead of changing the name of the street, (inaudible). [00:19:00]

EPLAN: I think that's partly right. I'd like to -- I really would like to find some examples of that before I nail down what -- I don't know what I had in mind, I really don't. But I -- but I know where -- I feel certain that I could find good examples of that.

BAYOR: I'm sure it happened. I mean, you said it, and I think I've come across examples myself.

EPLAN: I think it happened, too. Yeah.

BAYOR: In regards to MARTA (inaudible), I was curious why it went west first, and was that an effort to satisfy the black community who had support --

EPLAN: It went east-west? The line -- the first line they opened up was the east line. They opened it up almost a year before, because they needed a test track, and that was the fastest, easiest way they could not have to come into

downtown connections. So they went -- they tested out their equipment [00:20:00] along a fairly flat surface.

BAYOR: Which was (inaudible) east-west and not north-south (inaudible).

EPLAN: No, the north-south was tunneled, and it was much, much more expensive and much (inaudible). So they had -- they went to the easiest one, the one where the line went on the surface or on an elevated (inaudible). So that was the reason. I will say that we were moving at the build model, just like you see it, and all of a sudden, in order to finish up -- in 1959, we began a massive study on -- model on transportation planning in Atlanta (inaudible). They collected all this data. For ten years, they went in and collected data, and they messed around with data, and it was an embarrassment. And finally, the Federal Highway Administration said, “Look here, we’re going to cut off your funds if you don’t finish that study.” So they brought in a consultant to really finish it off, get rid of it, we’re not going to pay attention to it, just get rid of it so that we can [00:21:00] start anew (inaudible), it wasn’t any good, anyhow. And they’re still using it, probably. (inaudible). And it came up at the right -- right at -- going to referendum that maybe we shouldn’t build an east-west -- excuse me -- quiet boy!

(break in audio)

EPLAN: They brought [Voorhees?] in to finish off the study and here we were in ’68, and we’re about to go to referendum, and Voorhees comes out with this study to show we really don’t need the east-west line. Or it could be a bus line. Much cheaper. We do need the north-south line because the line is elongated. Well, we could have killed him. I mean, everybody was about to kill (inaudible). And now that was -- that does affect the black community. The black community is very heavily on an east-west axis. And so even if [00:22:00] the figures did say that there was then -- there was no need, and Voorhees was very honest about it, I suspect that -- I don’t question their findings at all. Politically, it was impossible, and they would never have -- so we went ahead and voted on a rail system, east-west. So you had to go east-west. So just the opposite -- what I’m saying is just the opposite occurred. It wasn’t a anti-race thing, anti-black thing that us made it open (inaudible). It was a pro-black -- to get the black vote, we had to see the same thing happen with the [Perry?] -- with the Proctor Creek line. At the last minute, we wanted to drop the -- they wanted to drop the Proctor Creek line, because we just couldn’t afford the whole thing. And the black community said “No, no, we

can’t do that.” So we did, [00:23:00] we didn’t extended the first segments of the system, except to 285 in the west. We picked up the mileage that we wanted for it to go, which was going to go to the river, and put it on the Proctor Creek line so they’d build the Proctor Creek line to -- even at the meeting, I remember the meeting. It was black leadership in the MARTA offices.

BAYOR: Who was there?

EPLAN: (inaudible) was there.

BAYOR: Jesse Hill?

EPLAN: No, I don’t remember Jesse there. I don’t remember all the people there, but I do remember that -- I completely forget, the first black senator, who became head of the stadium authority -- he was there, probably.

BAYOR: So -- well, by racial motivation, I don’t mean just racism, I mean [00:24:00] --

EPLAN: Race is a factor.

BAYOR: Was a factor, that’s what we’re really talking about.

EPLAN: Race is a factor in all decisions in Atlanta.

BAYOR: You think so? That’s why we’re talking about it, in terms of the highways, in terms of MARTA now.

EPLAN: There are virtually no major decisions made in the city of Atlanta that do not have a racial factor built into it.

BAYOR: That’s what I was trying to --

EPLAN: None. Nothing.

BAYOR: In terms of building a political city, race --

EPLAN: Everything has a racial -- has a racial component.

BAYOR: When you were commissioner of budget and planning in Jackson, do you remember any situations in which racial factors played a role at all, in terms of planning for the city?

EPLAN: Oh, yeah. How long you got?

BAYOR: (laughter)

EPLAN: Racial factors were always there, you know, but the single most thing -- the single overriding thing was how we allocated our budget resources, the capital resources. [00:25:00] What we found is that all the park money was being spent on the north side of town, and so we reallocated that so that a lot of the money was spent in black areas. In the white administration, the tendency was that -- well, the parks (inaudible). People don’t realize that the overwhelming majority of people who lived in Atlanta lived south of where we are now, 14th Street. Overwhelmingly. We’re talking about 65%, 70%, lived south of here, yet when you look to see where the parks are, (inaudible) garbage takes place, or the paved streets, or whatever, the moneys that go into the south end -- now, we

tried to diminish that. So we did not -- I had the opportunity many times -- I was asked to do this, many times, to find out how much money was going into each of the council districts by facility. [00:26:00] I refused to do it because it's so obvious, if I did it, it would -- we would Balkanize the city that people would say, "We need to put things in my district, because I have 15% less than he has." I tried to avoid that. I tried to get the priority set up on the basis of need, and not on the basis of "Well, we don't get as much as somebody else." But they always argued it on what constitutes not getting as much. You know, you can -- the way you -- you're a statistician, you know, you know you can find all sorts of ways of making that point in your favor. So -- but it was clear that we were not putting money on the south side. What -- it so happened that --

BAYOR: This just (inaudible)?

EPLAN: No, no, no, for all -- all of our capital resources. Where pipes go, where street resurfacing goes, where drainage [00:27:00] -- storm drainage systems go, how you allocate those moneys, I mean, we're talking about millions and millions and millions of dollars --

BAYOR: It’s amazing, even by that time, that’s where -- that’s where Ivan Allen himself had tried to do things for the black community, you still had this situation.

EPLAN: Well, no one had ever really -- see, they’d never had -- the city government was reorganized, and they created a fairly powerful office which I occupied, where I had both planning and budgeting responsibilities. And I was able to compare, and [perfect?] planning had not been particularly well regarded -- had not (inaudible) very much in the city’s administration. I was now [alerted?] to that, under Andrew Young. But during that period when Andy was -- I mean, that Maynard was there, and that I was there, to help formulate that. [00:28:00] Maynard was able to push planning -- the new charter required an annual comprehensive plan. The city, annually. No other city in America had that. And it also taps the budget. So Andy took that apart. Buried planning under three layers of bureaucracy, put planning and budget policy in his office, and then gave it back to finance; the last thing in the world you want is budget and policy to be is finance. It’s an accounting function, finance. There’s no policy. So anyhow -- but during those years, we had the wherewithal to begin to do planning and also to look at budget policy, and to link the two. So the first time we were able to do some

analysis, and what we found is that we were really under -- under-expending in -- of our resources in that area. The other thing, other factor, there was a (inaudible). This is a very subtle thing, [00:29:00] I'm not sure how much you really want to go into these things, but it was so fundamental to our decision making. We had all these federal programs, these -- that were devoted to -- I'm thinking of the name, (inaudible), where you had a program for a single -- for a single -- to solve a single problem. You know, you have park law, so you've got -- let's say you had a park law, that set up a certain amount for parks. You have primary education, secondary. You had all these federal funds coming in to the city, (inaudible), and so -- and they said quite [clearly?] that the money was to be spent to help poverty areas, or to help people in aging areas, [00:30:00] or areas where housing was deteriorating, or whatever the criteria was, to help those areas. So what happened, we had all these federal funds coming into these areas.

BAYOR: (inaudible).

EPLAN: What happened was we then withdrew all of our local money, and put it into the (inaudible). We began to make a segment for the way we spend money.

BAYOR: So the federal money goes to the black areas --

EPLAN: That's right, because that's what they were -- that's what they were written for, and that's what they were directed for. And so we took on that one, so if the problem happened in Chastain Park, we took our local money and used that.

BAYOR: Well, previously, I guess -- well, at what point did the federal money start appearing?

EPLAN: In the '60s.

BAYOR: So under Massell, let's say?

EPLAN: No, no, under, you know --

BAYOR: Under Allen?

EPLAN: -- Under Allen. Allen went out in '68.

BAYOR: OK, but if the money -- federal money is coming in under Allen, would Allen use that money for the black areas at all? Or did he --

EPLAN: The federal funding was once again going to black areas.

BAYOR: In the '60s.

EPLAN: In the '60s. [00:31:00] With the Great Society programs, the federal money began in the '60s. So we automatically began to take our tax moneys, local tax moneys, and put them wherever we needed them, which was then where the federal grants wouldn't be spent, and since the money was so great, far beyond anything we had ever

known for capital expenditure, why, we were able to satisfy all our needs in the black areas. What happened was, in the ’80s, is that when that money started -- federal money began to be cut off, where the money stopped was in the black areas. But --

BAYOR: But [that was unusual?], [and there were black mayors?] to not re-channel the local money into some of the black areas.

EPLAN: Well, see, without planning, if you don’t have any in the city anymore, it becomes a political decision, totally a political decision. We have no -- we have no policies, planning policies that we -- one of our planning policies [00:32:00] is actually -- for instance, was to target certain neighborhoods. It was encouraged under the community development funds. So the federal funds would come -- so federal [county?] funds were going into an area, we took our park funds, put in an area so we have -- had an enormous amount of funds focused on a single area, even though the criteria may have been different, and we had a lot of choices, we tended to decide to target the funding toward all the areas we wanted to something about.

BAYOR: OK, so I guess the areas (inaudible) were probably more just for the black areas, which had been affected (inaudible).

EPLAN: Well --

BAYOR: (inaudible)

EPLAN: But we say -- the reason I don't quickly embrace [00:33:00] that idea is because I think we have to be very careful with a city which is 68% black. And to say -- so most of the city is black anyhow. To say that we're going because they're black was not totally correct. It may end up that way, but we were going to places that we could show from the 1970 census, at the time, that were places that had had high deficiencies in terms of housing quality, in terms of utility-wise, and so forth. And a lot of those areas -- most of those areas were black.

BAYOR: Because nobody --

EPLAN: The only whites that were left that we -- we had very few (inaudible), you know?

BAYOR: I guess that's true.

EPLAN: We had East Atlanta, Cabbagetown, at that time [00:34:00] we had Loring Heights, but it -- you know, it had become middle class, and even the area near Georgia Tech, which was poor, which is now going up in (inaudible), but we really had very few areas we could hold on, (inaudible).

BAYOR: Was -- you know, back in the '50s or '40s when blacks (inaudible) a third of the city, they certainly weren't

getting a third of the funding. They were getting virtually nothing, really. So this is --

EPLAN: No, no, there's no question that giving blacks -- like I said, a combination of the federal programs, federal funds, and getting blacks in the city council, starting with [Cutie Williams?], has brought a lot of attention of the need to put money into the poverty areas, many of which were -- most of which were black.

BAYOR: So in other words, the type of decisions [00:35:00] you were making as --

EPLAN: I want to be very careful, though, not to -- to make judgments, to apply not feeling that these were racial -- racially motivated, and it ended up as a racial context. But on -- I have to be very careful not to overstate the degree of which these were motivated by race.

BAYOR: That race was a consideration.

EPLAN: Race is a consideration and, in fact, it came down where it had a great deal to do with effects on black areas, but I don't -- again, that whole question of whether or not (inaudible) the highway for the whites [coming in?]. Is it simply because it was a slum, or because it was black? And I would contend, for that particular case, that it was because it was a slum. [00:36:00]

BAYOR: I guess one of the things I was thinking was whether there was any change in policies with the black administration coming in, in regards to, let's say, saving inner city neighborhoods, more citizen participation in planning decisions, was would a black administration bring any kind of new aspect to planning, in an effort to sort of provide more voice for the black communities in the city?

EPLAN: (pause) I -- it's hard to separate out why it is that we sort of -- you know, why we do certain things, because there are a lot of factors in -- so, there was no question that [00:37:00] having blacks in the administration, having blacks in the city council, and once we set up the [interview?] program, having blacks participating in (inaudible), made us more aware of the needs in the black areas. [I'm not?] -- and I suspect that we would have -- that if there were a white mayor at that time, he would be somewhat less sensitive. Even more -- one of the things that happened was that we had a lot of black administrators. We had eight commissioners who were (inaudible). In fact, the commissioner of public works, (inaudible), who was black, who employed half the city employees in one department. [00:38:00] And he said, (inaudible) had half the employment of the city government, and it was headed by [Hart?]. There's no question that

this department (inaudible) more openness, and I suspect more than what had occurred if there was a white administration, without white administrators under him. The federal -- the (inaudible) moneys, however, were extremely important, because they weren't earmarked to (inaudible) how many are used (inaudible). When you have moneys that are earmarked for certain purposes --

BAYOR: And the general funds were (inaudible), but they were earmarked particularly for the poor areas (inaudible).

(overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

EPLAN: That's correct. They were earmarked. [00:39:00] Now, the fact is that in order to use those moneys, you had to put them in poor areas. That had nothing to do with a black administration. That happened under Ivan Allen; it happened under Massell. And so we were forced -- we wanted these moneys, and we were the first ones in line, for the federal (inaudible) program, first in line for the (inaudible) moneys, first in line for the community development moneys. We were always ready, and they always went into where they were appropriate.

BAYOR: See, my feeling is not so much that race as an issue was always prominent, but it was always that an underlying sub-issue, or motivation. It was there, but not at least right on top, in terms of why public housing was put in

certain places, and it might have been [crossing the line?], and I think it was also placed at times (inaudible) [buffer reasons?]. [00:40:00]

EPLAN: (inaudible).

BAYOR: Yeah, to serve as buffers (inaudible).

EPLAN: I know that Ivan Allen put that terrible [Bowen?] Homes, which was flooded and had all of the (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) that got there one night, and so forth. I had [dug out?] -- the guy who headed the planning program, planning bureau, when I was commissioner, [Collier Gladin?], Collier -- he was -- Collier was a great (inaudible). He was really -- Collier Gladin, G-L-A-D-I-N, he was director of planning in the Hartsfield and the -- I guess he went (inaudible), but I know he was director all under Ivan Allen and Massell, and he became -- when we reorganized the government in 1974, and we put planning as a bureau rather than a department, (inaudible) budget policy (inaudible). He was still head of the bureau of funding. He pulled out a memo that he had written [00:41:00] Ivan Allen, let’s see, strongly recommending against Bowen Homes out there, because it was such an isolated place, and that people -- it was -- it was subject to flooding, and it was a bad location. Ivan Allen -- I did these studies for Ivan Allen when he was mayor, he --

in the early ’60s, moneys came -- you had to prove a need for federal funds, and the need for housing, I did the studies that estimated the amount of public housing or subsidized housing, you know, public [subsidized?] housing we needed in the city. Something like 17,000 units. We were right -- need it right now. Well, he just took off like [a big bird?]. All we had to do is tell him -- he didn’t care about planning, but all you had to is just give him a figure, and he went off. And he started building public housing everywhere.

BAYOR: Now why the Bowen (inaudible)?

EPLAN: Because the land was available. [00:42:00]

BAYOR: Yeah, so there was no (inaudible).

EPLAN: And Ivan -- and Collier showed me a memo where he had argued against that, because there was no public transportation, it was lousy land, and so forth. But he was hell-bent on building these 17,000 units. And we were in bad shape in the early ’60s, and that’s how we wanted to solve the racial problem [originally?] (inaudible) by creating better housing.

BAYOR: [Whites?] could live in the city?

EPLAN: Yes.

BAYOR: You were commissioner of budget planning throughout the Jackson administration?

EPLAN: No. First [two?] years.

BAYOR: First two years.

EPLAN: My deputy came in for one year, [David Griffith?], a fellow, and he's now head of a huge department in Washington, DC, (inaudible). And then [Richard Leyton?] came in. They say the problem with Richard Leyton is Richard was really a commissioner for (inaudible). And Richard was a budget analyst. [00:43:00] And not [a planner?], so he didn't use planning as a basis for creating policy. (inaudible) created policy by getting some numbers together and weighing things, and this is better policy than that policy. I created policy by talking about the future, and how to get there, and then begin to devise ways (inaudible). It's a different way of approaching it. But as a result, Richard didn't pay much attention to the planning bureau at all. And so he had this -- so it became a different instrument, but he was -- he was essentially commissioner during the second administration, and I was commissioner during the (inaudible).

BAYOR: Two other things. I don't know if you ever read a book called [00:44:00] *Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent*, by [Clarence?] Stone, (inaudible). Well, anyway.

EPLAN: He studied city planning in Atlanta?

BAYOR: Yes. Actually, urban renewal, that was what the book was about.

EPLAN: How long ago was that?

BAYOR: It came out in the ’70s.

EPLAN: I’m surprised I don’t know about that.

BAYOR: A lot of information from public [agencies?] (inaudible). He says that at the city’s instigation, a north-south freeway was shifted from a proposed route west of the CBD, which would have elevated it over the railroad gulch area, to a route that looped around the eastern periphery of the CBD. Apparently [going in?] the east-west, the north-south freeway served to displace a large number of low-income blacks. In other words, the road was shifted from the railroad gulch to the east side to eliminate a large black area. (inaudible) at all?

EPLAN: That really predates your period -- predates my period. I have to say that [00:45:00] one would -- I always assume, however, that the reason that it went in that particular location was that we had a -- and I was involved in this decision, that we had three urban renewal projects. The first three projects in Atlanta. One was around Atlanta University, one was around the stadium, and the third one was around Bedford Pine, which was our worst

slum, Buttermilk Bottom. You wouldn't believe -- I mean, it was like a third world nation (inaudible). And so that became really our first urban renewal project. That land was available.

BAYOR: [OK, and it was cheap?].

EPLAN: It was not only cheap, but it was assembled -- people had already been thrown out, there was no relocation -- the relocation (inaudible) 1970, way after this, which was in the '50s. And I was involved with -- my first job here, I got, I think, my first job here in 1960, about [00:46:00] -- 1956. December or November '56, I came in. And they were doing -- it was Phil Hammer, the economist. And Phil had the contract to do the market analysis for that urban (inaudible) in the first urban renewal [contract?]. While he did planning, did the planning on -- on the Bedford Pine project. It wasn't called Bedford Pine.

BAYOR: It was Buttermilk Bottom.

EPLAN: It was called Buttermilk Bottom, but that was the area. Urban renewal, why, you bought land, cleared -- you removed people, cleared the land, put in utilities, streets, and so forth, and then you sold it. The -- my judgment was -- had always been that the the reason why the highway went the way it did was because that's where the urban renewal project was, and the land was available.

[00:47:00] It was probably cheap, too, but it was available.

BAYOR: So people had been cleared out already.

EPLAN: People had been cleared by urban renewal --

(break in audio)

BAYOR: So --

EPLAN: Under urban renewal, there was not the strong [permit?]. They did do some relocation. The highway had no interest in (inaudible). I did some studies for [one of our?] (inaudible). But that came out with a devastating figure that in the 10-year period between ’55 and ’65, we dislocated, through (inaudible) and highways, but also through some public housing -- (inaudible) we dislocated 67,000 people. Sixty-seven thousand people! I mean (inaudible). It’s an incredible figure. A lot of those people in that (inaudible), they did not -- there was no relocation law at that time, must have been in the ’70s. There was an expert [00:48:00] in urban renewal, on highways and urban renewal, who helped people find new housing. But [by ’70?] there was money set up for relocation. And there was a requirement that you had to re-- I mean, this (inaudible) -- this killed urban renewal, as much as (inaudible). In order to dislocate people, we had to find them [standard housing?] at affordable rent.

BAYOR: Which is (inaudible).

EPLAN: Which was impossible. And that was an enormous cost. And we weren't building housing to that degree. And that was a major factor in killing urban renewal.

BAYOR: But the highway came through, basically, on the area that had already been cleared. It was already --

EPLAN: The highway -- as I recall, the highway was in the plans before clearance was made. But the land was already asked for urban -- and so that's the reason -- as far as I can tell, and it was the urban renewal project that cleared those people [00:49:00] out of the east -- the west side -- east side, more than the highways. The highways did get put in that land, but you know, we call it, what -- you know, which came first? I'm not positive, but my guess would be that it was the urban renewal plan, a lot of them. And you can talk to the guy who did the planning, he's still around. That's -- he's now retired from the [Robin?] Company, [Lambrey Steiner?] did the planning on that. He probably could tell you. He wanted to build a lake. A great, great idea. I told him, you know, he was a dreamer. He had all these crazy notions. He'd known this. Crazy notions of these extravagant things that he wanted to do with Atlanta. And I could say that after 30 years of planning, I look back on them and think, "God, those were

imaginative ideas." [00:50:00] We really lacked the imagination to understand -- one of them was he wanted to build -- he wanted to build a lake between the two bridges that are -- one on Boulevard, where Grady is. And then we have the bridge at Peachtree, and we had that great (inaudible). He wanted to make -- create a lake down there put housing on the sides, like a European city, and we put a highway in it.

BAYOR: I guess nobody ever thought of building housing for the poor in that area. I mean, putting these people (inaudible) have to move back into decent, low-cost housing.

EPLAN: There were some plans for that. For instance, Ivan Allen cleared out in the Summerhill project, which -- where the -- where the stadium is now. Ivan Allen had designated that for public housing, the stadium project. And the -- [00:51:00] so he wanted to build a white project.

BAYOR: Oh, a white project, huh?

EPLAN: And the blacks walked in and said, "You need to build a black project there." They said, "Why a white project?" They said, "You don't want to do any more white projects -- or black projects, but you're going to build a white project there." And they just read him the riot act. Well, the downtown business community didn't want another

black project on the edge of the central business district. So there he was with this dilemma. He had his land, cleared and ready to go, and that's when the idea of the stadium began to form.

BAYOR: OK, so initially, where the stadium is then --

(overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

BAYOR: -- white project.

EPLAN: That's right.

BAYOR: Blacks said no, so he put a stadium. Obviously he wanted --

EPLAN: This community wanted black -- more black housing, public housing.

BAYOR: If he put -- if he planned a white project where the stadium is, then that was actually supposed to serve as a buffer, or at least it cleared the blacks out of the central business district area.

EPLAN: Absolutely.

BAYOR: And then -- so the stadium was put there as a buffer, then.

EPLAN: Well, [00:52:00] he couldn't think what to do with it. So the (inaudible) -- then would he have wanted a buffer there.

BAYOR: (inaudible). He wanted to do something --

EPLAN: I assume so, yeah. [Wouldn't help me?]. "What do you mean [helping?]?"

BAYOR: Yeah, sure.

EPLAN: He felt that there was an need for housing. I had come up with this 17,000 figure, and he was desperately looking for housing sites, and so he designated that for a housing site.

BAYOR: But a white one.

EPLAN: And -- that's right. And the blacks said no, (inaudible) black. Well, he didn't -- and the business community didn't want black housing there. So they came on this idea of a stadium, and I didn't see you know, the feasibility study for the stadium, and determine whether or not it was feasible. Of course, it was -- that's fine, I was presenting these, and we were going to build a stadium. We were going to do a feasibility study, so you need to come up with a feasibility study that showed (inaudible) (laughter).

BAYOR: (laughter) But, OK, so the urban renewal we had was, at least to a certain extent, black removal. They wanted to get the blacks out of the surrounding area.

EPLAN: Clear the slums, of course, but they wanted to -- it amounted to that, [00:53:00] and maybe you could characterize it that way. It was an effort to try to --

see, there was no competition for the downtown area in those days. Buckhead was nothing, and there was nothing on the perimeter. So we needed more room for the downtown to grow. And the perception was we had this urban renewal area, and we cleared the slums, and let the downtown grow, expand. And so it was an effort to allow the downtown to expand. The fact is it did remove blacks. Whether or not it was a black removal, it had the connotation that may or may not be -- it's probably not an untruth, but it characterizes it a little differently than I would characterize it.

BAYOR: But certainly they wanted the blacks to be shifted off to a different part of the city.

EPLAN: Yeah. Well what happened was -- and I've made speeches on this subject, I did at the time -- is that we didn't have relocation funds, so what [00:54:00] the tendency was for blacks to -- or people displaced, blacks and whites, to go the next neighborhood. So what happened is, you suddenly in the Inman Park area, in that area in Grant Park, you suddenly double and triple and quadruple the population, and you -- so the landlords came along and they took a one-family house and made it a four-family house. And apartments became divided up. And we -- and there were more cars in the street, and more kids in the

schools, and so forth. What may be temporary place to stay is a -- we created a slum. We just sort of pushed them back. Now, I can't say that the highway -- I'm not sure, (inaudible), whether the highway preceded urban renewal or whatever it was. All I -- or whether or not the urban renewal was carved to accommodate that highway, [00:55:00] I don't recall that.

BAYOR: It just seems it would have been a lot easier to put it over the railroad gulch area, which was uninhabited, rather than just go through --

EPLAN: Well, how would you deal with the railroad, though? You've got all the railroad tracks coming. You would have had to elevate the whole thing enormously.

(overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

BAYOR: How about the civic center? Is that also any kind of buffer? Was that put in as a way to keep blacks out of an area, so serve as a racial buffer in some sense?

EPLAN: No.

BAYOR: (inaudible) stadium, then?

EPLAN: Well, we had all this open land. There was no market for the open land.

BAYOR: Except for housing.

EPLAN: And we cleared it for public housing. The -- you could have had public housing back in there -- remember,

Atlanta has more -- still may have more public housing than any other city in America. Ten percent of all of housing is that. Excuse me, is (inaudible). Probably more than that now, because we had (inaudible) and we [spent it on housing?]. We had something like [00:56:00] 50,000 units for the 500,000 (inaudible).

BAYOR: I would guess, though, that if you had Maynard Jackson as mayor at that time, (inaudible), you would have had housing back in that area around the Civic Center first. I mean, this is really a businessman's decision rather than somebody --

EPLAN: How about if you had to (inaudible)?

BAYOR: Well, I would say he probably would definitely have housing back in that area.

EPLAN: Andrew Young is not a -- is a businessman in his decision. His whole attitude is that we need economic growth, and we need jobs, and we need businesses.

BAYOR: So you think he'd have the Civic Center [built?]?

EPLAN: I think Andy Young's attitudes are diametrically different than Maynard Jackson's attitudes. Andy Young is very pro -- he's run highways through neighborhoods. He doesn't care if we destroy neighborhoods. So to put it on a racial basis, I don't think it would be exactly right, because Andy would be different. The reasoning of Andy's

decision would be different. The business community walked in saying, “Look, we need this plan for businesses.” [00:57:00] Andy wouldn’t give a minute to public housing on this plan.

BAYOR: (inaudible) because he doesn’t want to (inaudible) he doesn’t want to -- he doesn’t speak to anybody; I don’t know about his administration. I don’t know why. OK, I guess the last thing, I don’t know if you would know anything about this, but apparently Sam Massell was telling me that had come up with a two-city plan at one point. The south side would become one city, and the north side another. Remember that at all? It seems like sort of an incredible idea, really.

EPLAN: Isn’t that interesting? I just -- I’ve got just vague memories of that. I wasn’t really active in Massell’s campaign. I was much more active with Ivan Allen, budget and planning studies. But Massell, whom I had known as a kid, childhood, I had no relationship at all with Sam. [00:58:00] Boy, I miss that old [thing?]. He (inaudible).

BAYOR: It tells you why the south side was not developed. Was there any racial aspect to that? You know, you have all the development going to the north side, all the money going to the north side?

EPLAN: Are you talking about outside the city, or are you talking about Buckhead?

BAYOR: Both Buckhead and outside. Well, even today they're talking about bringing the Singapore Group in to develop the south side, and apparently the south side has not been developed in this city. Is that because the blacks are there? And the whites went north?

EPLAN: I think that -- yeah, I think that was a very strong consideration. But you will also remember that there was an income difference that translates largely onto black-white. But it was primary -- you can't put a shopping center in a poor area. I'd be much more concerned, not about the new development, but the [00:59:00] withdrawal of the businesses, where you saw kind of the chains begin to close all of their chain operations in the poor area. Their stores was small and inefficient. That was the problem they had, and no (inaudible). Do you -- where do you live?

BAYOR: Cobb.

EPLAN: The -- that's right.

BAYOR: (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

EPLAN: There is a -- I'm trying to -- not to get too far adrift from this thing, but there is a -- there is a process that takes place, a -- there's what I've termed as

a “commercial lag.” As a neighborhood goes through transition, the population [01:00:00] becomes poor, and their buying power becomes poor. So in the neighborhoods, the commercial -- little neighborhood centers are relying on less and less buying power. The businesses are owned by the whites. So let’s assume that blacks are moving in, and you have these white businesspeople. Well, they’re very immobile. Unlike chain operations, they’re (inaudible). They really are clutching until -- almost desperately on that location, until the (inaudible) goes down, the ability of people to buy in cash goes down, they jack their prices up, so they’re accused of -- forced to price them out, in order just to -- because of the bad check, and because of debts, and because of a lot of things, maybe because they’re (inaudible). But whatever. Finally, [01:01:00] they leave. The process of recovery when -- occurs, and it’s much the same way. In other words, the commercial lags behind the withdrawal of the middle class and white communities by about several years. What happens is, when you begin to reinhabit, through gentrification and so forth, the vibrancy, is that the whites move in, and they’ve got a dedicated commercial area. And it takes years and years and years to begin to lure back the entrepreneurs. The chain operations won’t come back,

because they’re small and inefficient, and because they have national policies that show that this is not where they ought to [plan?]. And their data is out of date. They don’t know that the incomes are beginning to come back. So there’s a -- so one of the things I did when I was at the city, I had [01:02:00] a policy overview on the urban -- on the community development. I devised what was known as the neighborhood commercial revitalization program. And I selected two areas for the administration. One was Five Points and one the Capitol Heights area. One black, one white. And I said what we need to do is to try to help a new generation of entrepreneurs to come back into this area. And so we set up a loan program, and a commercial fiscal program to revitalize -- we sponsored a study for rebuilding Little Five Points, and so forth, to begin to rebuild, and to bring commercial back into this [type of thing?]. (inaudible).

BAYOR: It worked in the Little Five Points area. Did it work on the south side [too?]? Did they come back in?

EPLAN: The neighborhood had some success and ran with the ball, [01:03:00] there. And they were not -- there is no -- you had good incomes coming back in. Actually, people coming back into Capitol Heights were blacks, replacing the poor whites. And yet, it just didn’t pick up.

BAYOR: There’s certainly enough wealthy black areas in the south side, but you never really saw the boom in commercial development [from?] the north side.

EPLAN: [It’s not?] on the south side than on the west side.

BAYOR: Well, in the southwest, yeah.

(overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

EPLAN: You had to have -- well, the way they work is that you’re going to -- if you’re going to have public money, you can either just give the public money away, or the public can take an extra step of creating a plan, and helping people, and letting people participate in the plan publicly, and then giving -- and then set up a concept of what you want to achieve. If you don’t have planners, [01:04:00] in city government, in a decision-making position, the money is given out in a different way. A project comes in here, a project comes in, there is no policy. There is no direction. There is no vision. There is -- nothing. We don’t have planners.

BAYOR: (laughter)

EPLAN: Andy has diminished planning. He’s buried planning under three layers of people.

BAYOR: I didn’t realize he had changed the --

EPLAN: Totally, he has totally changed the whole -- he pulled the (inaudible) from budgeting, and he put planning in

community development, headed up by [Ernie Terkel?], who is head of the -- the [FEMA?] programs. I mean, here's planning, (inaudible), buried so far from City Hall there (inaudible). Buried so far from -- Andy is the opposed to planning. He's made many statements that it stands in the way of progress. It delays things. He doesn't like our participation.

BAYOR: Interesting. [01:05:00] Interesting for somebody who came up the way he did.

EPLAN: It is. To me, there's a parallel between Reagan and (inaudible).

BAYOR: (inaudible).

EPLAN: Absolutely, because the idea is -- his whole idea, the notion of what government is all about, and how are to free the private sector, and we've got to get jobs, and let's go around the world and see the -- there's a wonderful article (inaudible) by [Rick Allen?] last week about the election. A comment on Andy Young's mandate; it was right before the election. It's says Andy, there's no mandate; he's says there's no competition, but to interpret that as a mandate is a misreading. He said, Andy's not the mayor. [Koch?] is the mayor. When you think of Koch, you think of the mayor. When you think of Andy, you think of the mayor's emissary.

BAYOR: Well, he has a very hands-off approach, that's for sure, I mean, so.

EPLAN: We changed the government in '74 to have a strong mayor government. We took the power [01:06:00] out of the city council and put it on the mayor. In order to have a strong mayor government, you've got to have a strong mayor. You can't a strong mayor when the mayor's out of town 50% of the time. When he has no understanding, no vision of the future, no understanding, no policy planning, surrounded by people inexperienced in government, (inaudible) we don't have a -- we have a --

BAYOR: (inaudible).

EPLAN: So I just want to disassociate the notion that all -- that because a person's black, all blacks are going to have the same kind of interest for helping the black community, and have the same motivation and that type of thing. There is a world of difference between Maynard Jackson, who was anti-business, but who really wanted to change the priorities of this community, and Andy Young. And they're both black. [01:07:00] And to say because they're both black, they have the same way of operating, the same motivation of what they're doing, and the same ability to accomplish them --

BAYOR: Well, yeah, I know they don't have the same abilities, but I -- I would think initially that they would have the same sensitivities --

EPLAN: Sensitivities.

BAYOR: Sensitivities to the black community, right. Right. (inaudible), to a certain extent, at least.

EPLAN: I don't think -- but I think that that should -- you know, when you run a highway through a white community, you run a highway through a black community, there's a highway we killed, the highway going through the black community. There was a highway [670?] --

BAYOR: (inaudible)?

EPLAN: Here comes I-20 from the east, coming downtown. It jumps down and comes down into the stadium. We had developed a plan to continue I-20 -- no. We had a plan to bring a new road on down to [01:08:00] tie into the Lakewood Expressway. And it went through the Lakewood area, but it hit a black community where David Scott had (inaudible), [so he's a senator?]. And that highway would have taken very few houses, it would have relieved the downtown interchange near the stadium, and it would have provided a very good road, nowhere near the turmoil. It would have displaced some people. That road has been dropped.

BAYOR: Why, because Scott was there, or because it was a black area?

EPLAN: Well, Scott fought it. I don't think it was because it was black area --

BAYOR: And this was under Jackson.

EPLAN: This was under -- this was under Andy Young.

BAYOR: This was Andy Young. So in other words, Young was willing to drop a highway through a black community, fought tooth and nail not to drop it through the whites, so in other words, there is no sensitivity to the black community then.

EPLAN: Yeah. It was reverse discrimination. [01:09:00]

BAYOR: Well, yeah. That's interesting.

EPLAN: Let's call it by a different name.

BAYOR: And that highway first was thought of, when? When --

EPLAN: It was under -- it was a toll road, (inaudible: away from microphone)

BAYOR: Let's see, let me just show you. There were -- I'm trying to find all of the -- here we go.

EPLAN: No, this is -- this was the east side, this is not the -- this -- what -- a road was proposed to come down through here. Here's I-20

BAYOR: Or I-22.

EPLAN: And then, well, I-20, [01:10:00] all the way (inaudible), to [pick up 30?], the (inaudible) freeway, actually this isn't there, because (inaudible) actually comes over a little, and dead ends right at --

BAYOR: [So it's like a tollway?].

EPLAN: This was known as -- well, for a while, the whole notion of financing roads from tolls was, the whole notion, was experimented with. It was later dropped, and they dropped the whole notion of tollway authority. At the time, we were experimenting with this, you know, this was going to be a toll road here.

BAYOR: So in other words, so this was dropped, this Lakewood connection was dropped because it went through a black community --

EPLAN: That's right. Right here.

BAYOR: Yeah. This is all -- what year is this? What year is this?

EPLAN: I can't think of the name of the community.

BAYOR: So this was planned initially, then, under Jackson? He was --

EPLAN: Well, no, this preceded -- Jackson came in '74.

BAYOR: That's right, and this --

EPLAN: See, I was still a private consultant.

BAYOR: This was thought of during the Massell administration then.

EPLAN: That’s right. But it didn’t really come [01:11:00] to the surface -- it really didn’t come to a decision-making point of whether it was going to build or not until Andy Young.

BAYOR: And he said no.

EPLAN: And he said no.

BAYOR: That’s interesting. (inaudible) know what’s going on with the presidential complex.

EPLAN: Well, that was a different animal. That’s strictly a client relationship between Young and Carter.

BAYOR: Of course, you really wonder if the presidential complex going through a black area, wouldn’t he be so strongly in favor of it?

EPLAN: I think he’d be hard pressed. He would really be -- that’s a very easy obligation. If that had been a black area -- of course, it does -- you see, it’s already been cleared out. And it does hit east -- it does hit the Fourth Ward area, some of the Fourth Ward, which is black. But the clearance area, there will be no more clearance. (inaudible). If they were -- it had to be cleared, and if it went through a black area, it would be [01:12:00]

interesting to see how strong his allegiance to Carter be, definitely.

BAYOR: (inaudible) interesting. Well, thanks very much.

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