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DAN SWEAT: -- six, seven, eight, nine, ten.

RONALD BAYOR: OK. First thing I'm curious about is the reaction from the business community when Maynard Jackson became mayor.

SWEAT: I would say it was somewhere between serious concern and panic. Well, Maynard Jackson, of course, being the first black mayor... Now, let me step back one minute just to put myself in perspective, because probably of the number of reasons why I'm here and have been here for 15 years, that was the main reason. I -- you know, my background is I was involved as chief administrative officer under Allen, his administration. I was a newspaper reporter even going back, covered City Hall in the Hartsville days. [00:01:00] And then I came to -- I was Sam Massell's chief administrative officer for the first year and a half or so. So I've been involved through that, worked on both sides. I was, for a while, the only person that -- well, I was the communicator between Maynard Jackson and Massell at City Hall when they wouldn't speak

to each other, and Massell was mayor and Jackson was president of the city council. And I was -- I guess it was still [Robert Manning?] before then, before it changed, but anyway... And my title then was not just chief administrative officer; it was a weird title called chief administrative officer of the mayor and board of alders. So technically I worked for both, and I was the middle man, and -- literally -- the whipping boy in that process. Now, I do recall at one point I told Maynard -- because Maynard was going to run for mayor, [00:02:00] and he was cutting Massell down. Massell saw what was happening, and so he was going to be mayor and not let Maynard be mayor. And I remember a real discussion I had with Maynard. I finally told Maynard, I said, "Maynard, I'm in a [hell of a position?]." I said, "I've got to tell you, so you and I will understand where I'm coming from, I can't serve two masters. And the nature of this position, I have to serve the mayor. Now, if you were the mayor, I'd salute you. You ain't the mayor. Massell is the mayor. I have to salute Massell, and I want you to know that." You know... And he -- in fairness to him, he said, "I understand your dilemma, and I'll try not to put you in the middle any more than I have."

BAYOR: I didn't realize they didn't get along. I guess it was a political competition.

SWEAT: It was a political situation that was -- yeah. So at any rate, so I was there, and then I left there to go set up the Atlanta Regional Commission as its first executive director, and I did that, and was [fat, dumb?], and happy over there at the best public administrative organization in America, I think, really. [00:03:00] And then I was approached by the business community to come down here and take over this organization. And I [delayed on it?]. I just sort of [slipped off?] for months. I do -- over there I've got this thing going. I've got the best job in public administration in America. It paid more money than anybody in the South at that point, and got the best staff, 135 staff people, with mostly PhDs or master's degrees -- criminal justice, civic planning, public administration. I said, you know... And I've weathered the storm, did the Chattahoochee River study -- they're controversial. Did a couple other -- did wrestle the transportation planning away from Tom [Mormon?] at the State on a regional basis, (inaudible), and I said -- so, you know, I'm [riding high?], so why would I do this? (inaudible), while they didn't necessarily write it out or say unjust these words, the message just kept coming through. It was: things are

changing in the city. We know that, [00:04:00] and no longer can a handful of business leaders closely aligned through families, through civic ties, Massell, Ivan Allen, Woodruff, Mills Lane, [Dan Robinson?], so forth -- no longer can we gather out at the Piedmont Driving Club, you know, on Saturday afternoon and make the decisions 'cause the mayor said, "Listen, this is a good idea," and sort of get 'em moving. They recognized that you had all these movements going on in the city, in the country, environment. Citizen participation, a lot of it coming out of the war on poverty and that whole [maximum feasible?] participation [philosophy?] across a neighborhood, the neighborhood movement, anti-highway movement, women's liberation, historic preservation, environmental impact, [EEO?], all those things, which was enough to make any self-respecting white businessman quake in his boots, you know? So they recognized those were changing, and they -- and [00:05:00] at the same time that old [line?] group was getting old, dying off, retiring, and as the city was expanding you had all these new business faces showing up that needed to get involved in the process of decision-making. You had the new developers, like the [Cousins?] and the [Portmans?] and the [Carters?] coming on the scene, and then as the mostly regional firms of the National

Office were being located, you had some pretty significant [business political?] decisions. We want in. So that -- they recognized there had to be some change. But the major change was they recognized we were going to have a black mayor come 1974, in January, and that there would be black political power, and there had to be a whole new way to communicate with City Hall and with the control of the public sector. And so that was the reason they [kept coming?]. You know, your background -- you've worked at both camps, mainly on the public side. You worked [00:06:00] with the black leadership from the -- worked at the grassroots, the poverty program as the first employee of the war on poverty here, really organized a lot of (inaudible).

BAYOR: So you had the connections (inaudible).

SWEAT: Huh?

BAYOR: You had the connections with the black community.

SWEAT: Yeah, I was acceptable, and the black community trusted me. I was also -- because I did a lot of regional commission, I was hired, acceptable to the county commissioners and the mayors out in the suburbs, and I had basically a good relationship with the press and everybody else. And I had both the academic credentials and the management experience of a public administrator. So they

said -- so they came up, said, "Well, you've got to do this," and so they kept coming back, and finally I succumbed. And I'm glad I did, frankly, 'cause it's more to my whole makeup and personality style than (inaudible) [commission onto?] (inaudible). [I'm impatient?].

[00:07:00] And I [actually think about now?] rather than planning for the year 2010, which is what Harry West, my successor, my -- I wouldn't call him my protégé, but certainly I got him over there and left him over there -- that's -- Harry's style is great. He's done a great job. For me, I have to [see things?]. So that's what happened, and I came in as the liaison, the middle man, and recognized the great fear, the great fear that Maynard Jackson, who's the first black mayor, I mean, what -- you know, he's coming in with a social agenda, things are changed. So there was a great sense of apprehension, fear, and --

BAYOR: (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) --

SWEAT: -- in some cases bordering on panic.

BAYOR: What was the sense that (inaudible)? [Was this it?], this general fear? Was there any basis to business leaders' charge he was anti-white?

SWEAT: There was a perception that he was anti-white, and I'm sure in your research and in the headlines of newspapers --

you're probably thinking about the big headline that came out one day that created -- [got be marched on?] by some of my friends, like [Julia Barr?], [00:08:00] and so forth, where [CP?] had released this report that -- one of the things said the mayor was perceived to be anti-white, the Brockey letter. Are you familiar with that?

BAYOR: No, (inaudible).

SWEAT: OK, I'm going to give you -- I've just been moving; I ran across copies of that Brockey letter.

BAYOR: Oh, good.

SWEAT: What happened -- Harold Brockey was the chairman -- he was chairman of Rich's. He was the guy that hired (inaudible). We did a survey -- because of the very thing you're talking about, the attitude (inaudible) concern, so we did a quick survey, analysis, out there of the chief concerns among business. And, and one of the things in there was the perception -- the mayor's perceived -- the new mayor's perceived to be anti-white. Well, I had concerns about that, because I knew that that could cause a lot of racial problems, so I -- the night before we delivered that to Maynard Jackson I sat on a program with Maynard Jackson, Leadership Atlanta, and I told Maynard -- I said, "Maynard, [00:09:00] I got a problem. We got this report that we think -- we want to share with you because

we want to be open, but it's -- we don't want to be... You know, what do we do? This is the language. Shall we take it out?" He said, "Don't take it out. Then it would not be honest to take it out." I said, "Well, it will be honest, but I don't know if -- you know, [everybody's?] kneejerk." He said, "Give it to me. Don't take anything out." So I went over to Harold Brockey the next morning, we went over, delivered it to the mayor. I said, "Now, Mr. Brockey, this could create some problems. I talked to Maynard." (inaudible) "I don't see it's going to create any problems." So when I talked to him -- so (inaudible) knowing how things worked, it's probably going to cause a problem. We went over, had a good meeting with Maynard, delivered it to him, left. Hell, it wasn't 20 minutes after I got back before I had a call from (inaudible). "Dan, what is this Brockey letter?" The mayor, some of the mayor's staff people had gotten upset about that line and told [Sprawley?], who was a City Hall reporter, [00:10:00] and he called Brockey, and Brockey said, "What are you talking about? We didn't -- we didn't [know that?] (inaudible). It -- there was double headlines across the [blue streak?], front page, "Businessmen express grave fear [with the?] mayor," and you can't believe what it caused, the controversy around here. And so --



BAYOR: It was (inaudible).

SWEAT: It was felt, and it's still felt. It's still felt.

Maynard and I talk about this to this day. He's on my board here, and we're friends, but we still -- that's still a concern.

BAYOR: Was it because of his efforts to force the banks into affirmative action?

SWEAT: That was part of it. Maynard came in -- and really, I never really felt like Maynard was anti-white. I really didn't, and I don't now. But he came -- he had to come as the first black mayor. If it had been anybody, they would've had to come in with this -- a different type of agenda, social agenda. And while we had made great strides over there, and I brought the first blacks in as department heads and things, there was still [00:11:00] -- that wasn't the main agenda. So this had to be... I remember when Larry [Gillis?], that -- who was my chairman in '74, when Maynard came in, and we made our first courtesy call on Maynard right after he was elected. He took office (inaudible). Larry and I went over, and we sat in (inaudible), "Mr. Mayor, (inaudible) [Maynard?]" -- [you always ask the new chair requests?] (inaudible). "We're anxious to work with you in the administration." The first thing Maynard said, "I" -- he said, "I realize that CAP is

the most important organization in the city, you know. But," he said, "I can't work with you." Said, "Beg your pardon." He said, "Well, I can't work with you unless you change your makeup of the organization. You got to put on your board the head of the National Organization of Women and the head of the NAACP." I said, "Wait a minute, man. We had a democratic [00:12:00] (inaudible)... We're not representative. We don't purport to be. What you see is what you get, and we are not going to change. You got to be a CEO of a business." I said, "We've got black CEOs, but we're not racist. We've got..." I think we had one or two women (inaudible) [Chambers?] and... I said --

BAYOR: Jesse Hill from (inaudible) on there at the time?

SWEAT: Yeah, yeah. I said, "We're not sexist, either." I said, "We look sexist because we don't have any women, but women are eligible. Elitist? We might be elitist because of having the requirement of CEOs, but that's... But we're not representative." I said, "We're not going to do it." Of course, then, Maynard would keep talking, "Well, we got to bring other people to the table." Every time we'd try to talk with Maynard, we'd need to have -- sit down and have a discussion with him. And initially he'd take the position, "Well, I can't discuss that without other people at the table." I said, "Well, Maynard, you ain't gonna get

any decisions made. [00:13:00] You could bring yours to the table. You could bring others, and there are times when you can (inaudible), but you can't just force us to come to the table and sit down on equal terms with this self-styled head of the XYZ neighborhood association." I said, "That ain't the way it works, and it will not work that way." Well, then he took the position, "Well, I can't -- I'm going to take the money out of the -- I can't talk to backers unless they've got blacks and women on the board."

BAYOR: He was pushing for affirmative action (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) --

SWEAT: He was pushing for affirmative action. And I had no problem, and I still don't have any problem with affirmative action. I think his joint venture thing turned out to be the best thing he did, although it created a lot of problems. So he was heavy-handed. He was a young, big, black lawyer, argumentative. You had to argue with him every step of the way. That was his nature. If he'd been white, (inaudible) would've been the same thing.

BAYOR: You think so?

SWEAT: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

BAYOR: [00:14:00] (inaudible) says that during the time when he was pushing the banks for affirmative action and began

threatening to pull money out of the banks (inaudible), that some of his white [friends?] stayed with him, and you mentioned [particularly Paul Upton?], but he said most of his other white friends in the business leadership community cut and ran [and were very disappointed?]. Now, what was the role of Paul Upton here, and who -- you know...

SWEAT: Well... I'm not sure I can -- you know, (inaudible) was involved [in that to the board?], and Paul, you know, was one of the great leaders, and had a lot of influence, so... But in that particular context, I'm not sure (inaudible).

BAYOR: Let me mention a thing that (inaudible) said, and it was a meeting. I think it said (inaudible) [a lot of business?] (inaudible) Jackson (inaudible), and Alan made a comment there that business leaders in 1974, that "Some of us have gotten too concerned with wanting the city government to fail [00:15:00] because it's black." He made that statement. Now, [was that a feeling?]?

SWEAT: I suspect that it was a... I suspect among the committed people who loved Atlanta so much, (inaudible), that was not the feeling. They wouldn't want the [City Hall?] to fail [in any way?]. I suspect that there were a lot of whites that really (inaudible), but I never... That

didn't... In my experience, I'd never heard any legitimate business executives say, "I hope the son of a bitch falls on his face over there, (inaudible) get this black ass out of here," you know, nothing like that. I never heard that.

BAYOR: [What seemed to be?] (inaudible) perception, and [the mayors?] recently about the fact that there was a sort of philosophy of let the black administration fall apart and whites come back in and [00:16:00] clean it up.

SWEAT: I really don't... I never felt that, and because, I guess, of where I was, my position at the time, I worked -- and Maynard and I fought [a lot?], and we sort of laugh about it now. We talk about how it would be if he should be mayor again, and I'm not supporting him [at this point?], but that we could work -- use the energy that he and I had used at that point because he was first black mayor and I the head of (inaudible), that we could use the energy we used up sparring together to do things, what we could accomplish for the City, I think we agreed. So I didn't have that feeling. I was still working with the City to get things done, even though we fought on the way they went about doing it. And where I was is the -- I mean, every time the mayor would do something the business community didn't like, which was almost every day, you know, [00:17:00] man, they would call, "Sweat, you go and

get that son of a bitch mayor in line." Every time somebody (inaudible) [business sides?], he would call me, "Sweat, you better get your boy in line." I remember one morning -- I think it was the head of (inaudible) wrote an article in the newspaper about this whole relationship early on, that Maynard had no communication with the business community, etc., and he was quoted in there saying, "That's not true. I talk to Dan Sweat and Tom [Hamill?] at the Chamber of Commerce almost every day." Well, I called Maynard. I said, "Maynard," I said, "you and I do talk. Sometimes we're shouting at each other, but we talk frequently." I said, "I think that's true." But I said, "I think you're shortchanging yourself." I said, "You need to go and start directly..." I said, "You gave..." I said, "With that statement you made to the paper, you gave me more power than I want (inaudible). 'We don't have to deal with the SOB upfront. We get old Sweat to do it. Sweat...'" So that gives me [00:18:00] great power." I said, "I really don't want that (laughter) power, and I don't think that's fair to you." I said, "I think you need to go and talk directly to these business leaders yourself." And I said, "I'll tell you what I'll do." I said, "I will come over every day. You name the time. I will come over there with a list of CEOs, top

leaders, with some suggested assignment that you want them to do, and I will dial the telephone for you, I'll hold it up to your ear, and you say, 'Hello, Mr. CEO, this is your mayor, Maynard Jackson. I need your help. Would you chair this committee? Would you do this for me?'" I said, "Now, there'll be some stunned silence, and there'll probably be one or two heart attacks, but overwhelmingly there will be this "Yes, mayor. I will do it." [00:19:00] (inaudible) -- and so I urged him, and he did. I said, "Maynard," I said, "you know," I said -- I said, "why don't you do this?" I said, "Loosen up. You can have some fun with it, too." I said, "Just drive up in your big white limousine there, and walk in unannounced. Just make..." I said, "Ivan did that." Sam didn't do too much of it, but... I said, "(inaudible) and walk in. Say, 'Listen, is Mr. So-and-so here? I was in the neighborhood. I was down at the bank making a deposit in my account, and just thought I'd speak to him.'" I said, "That -- you'll find [a difference?]." But Maynard, he never really could do that to a great extent. Did more finally toward -- in his second term, you know, after he did get some [white?] support, you know, in the second term, and he did more of that then, but early on, I mean, it was (inaudible).

BAYOR: So pretty much anything he did to [00:20:00] challenge the business community on things like affirmative action were perceived as anti-white?

SWEAT: By -- I think by a good [point?].

BAYOR: Yeah. His feeling was that all he was trying to do was to bring blacks -- give blacks the legal rights to inclusion in the politics (inaudible) decision. He thought he was -- before blacks were working from a subordinate position; now blacks were in politics, they wanted to be on an equal level.

SWEAT: Well, I'll tell you one interesting -- he used to -- you know, he'd call me and say, "Dan, come over here. Would you -- can you come over (inaudible) the sheriff's (inaudible)?" And even though -- yeah, he used me as a devil's advocate a lot, too. But I remember he called me on one of these -- "I want to show you something." He said, "I have taken a look at the City contract." He said, "Blacks (inaudible) blacks really have about one-tenth of one percent of the City budget." He said, "Now, I'm going to come up -- I'm going to propose a program that will help bring that up to one half of one percent." He said, "Now, that's just [like that?], [00:21:00] but as far as the black community, (inaudible) it's a significant amount. I mean, to the black community, it's zilch." But he -- but



we... And he talked about the (inaudible) [approach?]. I said, "Maynard," [you know, I said?], "let me say something." I said, "Now, I was over here for a number of years, and with you. I know we had a lot of..." But I said, "Now, as you well know, I brought in -- I recruited, brought in the first two black department heads, personnel director and the (inaudible) director, and we made some progress." But, you know, I said, "I don't remember ever having the discussion with you, any of the black business leaders, anybody else about minority participation in the contract. You know, maybe I just got left out of the discussion, but (inaudible)." I said, "I'm not going to feel guilty about that." I said, "It just wasn't something that we thought about." Then I said, "But you're not going to need to feel guilty, [00:22:00] because you didn't come jump on me about it." And so -- but I agreed with the -- his joint venture concept. It caused a lot of problems, but... And I still -- I still keep urging him to make [a little?] headway. I keep trying to get the black community through -- (inaudible) the black academic institutions to do an in depth study of what that produced realistically, because it's still hanging over everybody. Did it just produce -- did it just make Herman richer? And Herman's a good friend of mine on the Board Executive Community. Or

did it give [Tom Cory?] a boost? And did it have a long-term impact, or just bring that guy from Cleveland in here to make a lot of profits and leave, and then created temporary jobs, and what happened to those people (inaudible)?

BAYOR: On the joint venture thing, the reaction from the business community there was pretty hostile, from what I've been hearing.

SWEAT: It was --

BAYOR: Especially in the (inaudible).

SWEAT: Yeah, because it was a new thing. The impression of most of the business community was [00:23:00] we're going to be forced to take Maynard's [cronies?] or City Council, some City Councilperson's brother, to pay them off and just have a black face and do nothing.

BAYOR: So they resisted for a while.

SWEAT: I think there was a good bit of resistance.

BAYOR: Now, didn't Massell also propose when -- that blacks get a certain percentage of (inaudible) contracts?

SWEAT: Yeah.

BAYOR: I mean, that's basically the same thing. He's suggesting joint venture (inaudible).

SWEAT: It was suggested, but he didn't. There was a difference in Massell suggesting this and Maynard Jackson dictating.

BAYOR: Oh, Massell never went through with it.

SWEAT: It was... It was an encouragement thing, but it wasn't put in his official policy.

BAYOR: How about some of the other things Jackson did? How about his efforts to fire Police Chief Inman? Was that an issue to the business community at all?

SWEAT: Well, it was an issue to... It was an issue to the business community, I think, because it... [00:24:00] A lot of them perceived it just to get rid of him, and then when he put Reggie Eaves, [came in?] Reggie Eaves, his old college buddy, that was an indication, I think, and a lot of concern, a lot of people, that... But Inman should never have been police chief to start with. That was a serious mistake. When I write my book I'm going to write all the inside stuff to this. (laughter) But I'll have to wait until those are (inaudible) before I can do it. Because I remember when I (inaudible) Regional Commission when a lot of this was going on, and I had -- I had the \$20 million high crime impact study grant from Washington, and I had the criminal justice planning responsibility, and I had two police chiefs, [very opposite?], two young police

chiefs doing my [work?]. And so I took them over [to him?], with all this stuff. I went over to Inman in his office. He was just -- he'd just been the police chief a little while when[00:25:00] all this started. I said, "Now, John, I don't want to meddle in your business, but we're spending all this money doing all this stuff. I've got two young police chiefs here, and I'm -- I want to offer them to assist you. What can we do to help you?" I was flabbergasted by Inman then. He was sitting there, (inaudible). He said, "I don't know." He said, "I'm not qualified to be the police chief. I don't know what questions to ask." At least he was honest about it!

BAYOR: So the business community didn't support Inman (inaudible) that issue.

SWEAT: No, no. It could've been Jenkins, you know, still in there, and then there would've been...

BAYOR: How about other things, like Jackson setting appointing powers over the (inaudible)? Did that -- was that an issue at all? The creation of [zoning?] (inaudible) Jackson's support for (inaudible)?

SWEAT: I don't know, but I don't think that was a big issue.

BAYOR: Given concerns about a black mayor -- and I guess it was pretty certain that a black [00:26:00] would be elected in '73 -- I was curious why there was a charter reform

right then that gave the mayor more powers. It seems to me if there was so much fear of a black mayor coming in, why...

SWEAT: Well, some of us had pushed -- and as a public administrator, I had pushed (laughter) for reform, and part of that -- the -- when the -- my position was created, Chief Administrative Officer (inaudible), there were some of us, me [inside?], [Gracie Hamilton?], the legislature, Jerry [Horton?], and then we got [Red Afton?] and some others, but Gracie Hamilton -- probably she had as much (inaudible) as anybody, but that felt we need to move toward a stronger administrative management capability in City Hall. (inaudible) system just didn't do that. You got a weak mayor system, you had, in fact, strong mayors (inaudible) to say. But [00:27:00] so there were noises that were being made, and, frankly, I was aiding and abetting that [with Gracie?]. The legislature was going to do something to change the form of government unless... So frankly, I -- as an attempt to -- Allen didn't really want [somebody?], but he realized that something needed to happen. So I drew up the staffing and the thing that created that, and the staff and how it would work, and it was a compromise to head off the legislature. Richard Freeman was [on this?]. Richard was on -- Richard was on

the automatic side as part of that discussion, and Milton [Barrett?], I think -- in an effort to get the -- keep the legislature from doing something, change the form of government.

BAYOR: So it had nothing to do with a black mayor coming in.

SWEAT: That had nothing to do. But it -- that was a step, [00:28:00] a compromise step, but there was still that concern that we needed to move toward a different system to clarify a lot of the problems and weaknesses in the old system (inaudible), had nothing to do with the new mayor.

BAYOR: Also curious -- at 1971, Vice Mayor Jackson said the following -- he criticized the reorganization of the Atlanta Region Metro Planning Commission, so as to, in effect, eliminate the influence of blacks on regional planning. I haven't found anything about that at all, and I was curious if you were on the ARC at that time?

SWEAT: Well, I drafted the bill, and I was its first executive director, and Maynard and I had some interesting discussions on that subject. And Maynard viewed -- I think (inaudible) -- viewed it as an attempt to create some mechanism to water down black influence, you know, take more away from the City. That was not... Here again you had sort of the same people that, [00:29:00] from the legislative side, who were trying to strengthen city

government that was behind that effort, and that was Gracie Hamilton, Jerry Horton, Red Afton --

BAYOR: On the ARC effort [or on the?] --

SWEAT: ARC effort, that's right. But I worked with them to help draft that bill. I know the first meeting we had was right across the street in the old Trust Company building (inaudible), to get that whole movement going. And then I didn't know I was going to end up as executive director. I was doing it, representing Mayor Allen as chief administrative officer in all these regional matters. So it was... And Gracie Hamilton and Horton and (inaudible). Gracie's black, you know, herself. But we're at the forefront of getting that done. She was... So there was nothing (inaudible), but Maynard -- I remember Maynard sat in my office one time, but right after (inaudible) take the job, I know Maynard came and sat down. And he was -- he was agitated. One of his [statements said?], "Well, Dan, [00:30:00] I don't care. Y'all can do what you want to to try to [water down?] the blacks in the city, but we'll be the majority of -- we'll be the majority of the region eventually anyway, so you're not going to be able to overcome." So he had -- he had some emotional feelings, I think, that that was the...

BAYOR: So it was his perception that was (inaudible).

SWEAT: Yeah.

BAYOR: OK. I want to move on to urban renewal, also. From what I can see, one of the goals, it seemed to me, in urban renewal was to get [more blacks?] up at the downtown area. Is that (inaudible) the slums, you get the poor blacks (inaudible)?

SWEAT: The urban renewal -- that whole process really started before I got involved in the city. I... I suppose some probably had that [version of it?]. I think that you might view it [as cleaning up?] the slums.

BAYOR: Did you see [00:31:00] any relation to the fact that there's so much (inaudible) in the city such as it is today related to the fact that there was an effort to keep public housing [out of that?] area and break up...?

SWEAT: Yeah, but all the public housing is in the central city, right around the... If you look on the other side of the coin, if you look at starting back in the '30s, way before urban renewal, and then continuing, and continuing after urban renewal, the city of Atlanta was the only jurisdiction trying to do anything about housing the poor. So if they had just eliminated their slums and not, on the other hand, pursued very vigorously federal funds for public housing, then I think they would've been guilty of what you're suggesting -- or somebody was suggesting --



might be the case. But if you look at public housing in Atlanta -- I don't know where it fits in now, but I know I used to -- (inaudible) used to talk about how Atlanta was the twenty-fifth or thirtieth, and it's one of the largest cities in America, something like that, but it had the [00:32:00] (inaudible) sixth largest amount of public housing, so -- on a per capita basis. This city has done more than almost any other city with regard to housing the poor. And when I went to City Hall, it was without... That was a big effort. We created the housing resources committee, and I was charged with helping to push the development -- housing of... I think I got about 8,000 public housing units built. Some of them are about to get torn down now, (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

BAYOR: There were a lot of complaints that the housing was being pushed towards the west side, and that there was a -- I guess [a congregation?] of the housing was being pushed [onto?] the west side.

SWEAT: Well, that's not true. East Lake Meadows is on the east side. Capitol Homes is on the east side.

BAYOR: Nothing on the north side.

SWEAT: Huh?

BAYOR: Nothing on the north, northeast.

SWEAT: Nothing on the northeast. And I suspect -- well, and that certainly was a political problem, as well as a problem of economics, a whole lot of things, just like now. You know, the Housing Authority can't [00:33:00] (inaudible). They had to give back this money or it's going back. Today, because HUD said you got to put it -- you can't put it in Buckhead. I mean, that doesn't make sense, economically or really socially, in my view.

BAYOR: Yeah, because there was a lot of pressure in the black community at the time for (inaudible) public housing (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

SWEAT: Yeah, and in defense of me and those that were involved, when Allen told me to get this thing moving that I've got [Colonel Jones?] from the Building Inspector's Office assigned to it to help staff that committee, and I told -- I said, "OK, Colonel..." When I had found out, there were -- had been zoning [patterns?] to the past, that we found out -- we looked at all of them, and we found these weird, weird tracts had been zoned, and it was obvious, you know, that probably they'd been zoned as barriers and buffers all around. Yeah, so I said, "OK, Colonel, you identify sites throughout the city, throughout the city, [00:34:00] no holds barred, where we can pursue public housing." And I remember I went to Allen. And it

was funny... (laughter) [I was about to say this?].

You'll...

BAYOR: Want me to turn it off?

SWEAT: Yeah. (laughter) Turn it off.

(break in tape)

BAYOR: [It will never?] (inaudible). (laughter)

SWEAT: Yeah.

BAYOR: So I guess your feeling was -- I guess from the black point of view all the public housing was being pushed to the west side. Their feeling was that blacks moving out of the central business district, and everything was being shifted to the west and they were being, in a sense, reghettoized in that area. That was their point of view.

SWEAT: There probably was a certain, you know, truth in that, but it didn't have all -- didn't have, in my view, a lot to do with (inaudible) to reghettoize. It was just a fact of [00:35:00] economics and political (inaudible).

BAYOR: What about the placing of the Omni? I've got something from the *Atlanta Voice* which claims that the Omni, the Omni complex was built as a buffer to keep blacks from advancing to the west side.

SWEAT: Absolutely not. No truth in that at all. It was a dream of Chuck Palmer.

BAYOR: That's right.

SWEAT: He'd been -- I don't know if you ever read his *Adventures of a Slumlord*. He was a guy (inaudible) Roosevelt (inaudible) father of public housing in America. And he -- Chuck Palmer is the one that got that going. He had first started out on those [days?] -- he owned the -- well, he was located in the [Glenville?], and I used to sit there with Chuck (inaudible) Palmer -- I loved the old guy -- in his office, and looking over that site, that he was trying to get a big World's Fair there, [00:36:00] and that was the site he wanted the World's Fair on, and it just never materialized. But he [saw?] revitalizing that area over the railroad really (inaudible) World's Fair to leave something in place. That didn't materialize, so the concept of the World Congress kind of sort of evolved out of there, and that was the site. I never heard any discussion of a buffer, and it's...

BAYOR: I haven't heard it, either. I mean, [it doesn't?] --

SWEAT: There's no truth in that.

BAYOR: (inaudible) [what they heard?].

SWEAT: Yeah, no.

BAYOR: Now, I did hear, in relation to the placing of the stadium, that that had been put up as a buffer, a racial buffer, or that they'd had original plans by Ivan Allen for a white project in that area, and that there were protests

from black leaders who wanted a black project there.

Caught between the business community and the black leaders, Allen finally decided to just put the stadium in that section.

SWEAT: I -- that was before I was involved, so I don't know the... You know, I've read the [Disher?] stories, and I've heard [00:37:00] Allen talk about him and Mills and [knucklehead?] from California -- what was that guy's name, (inaudible)? [Trying to get a team in here, and?]....

BAYOR: Oh, a baseball team.

SWEAT: And, you know, where they [they owned the?] site, and [Dennis said?], "I can get a truck (inaudible) [to the site now?]," [and this?]....

BAYOR: What about when Ivan Allen was mayor? When I spoke to him, he said something to the effect that his pro-civil rights stand helped Atlanta get more money in the various (inaudible).

SWEAT: It sure as hell did. But I was -- that's why I was hired by -- as the federal bagman. And Allen was... You know, and I recognized -- of course, recognized (inaudible). Allen initially wanted it put in Washington, made (inaudible) and Leo said -- John Lindsay had set up an office in Washington [out of?] New York. That was a first effort. [00:38:00] I -- as far as I could determine, I was

the first federal bagman in a city hall outside of [what Lindsay had done?]. And Allen, you know, wanted me to go, and I said, "No, I'm not going up there. I don't want to live in Washington." I said, you know, I'd get on the [Delta out here?]. "This is important. I think I should be located in the mayor's office here, help you determine what our priorities are, and then we'll go after the money to address our priorities." And I said, you know, "I can get that early bird up there in the morning, come back (inaudible) bird. No problem there." I said -- frankly, really, because Allen had been the only Southern politician testified for the first Civil Rights Act. We had Colonel Sanders, who was governor, who was a friend of Lyndon Johnson's and ate barbecue on the (inaudible) with him. We had two liberal Democratic Congressmen, [Mackie?] and [Weldman?]. And we had the civil rights leadership here in Atlanta, you know? For God's sake. So I said, "Listen: Atlanta is a fair-haired city with all this going for us." I said, "I could go up there [00:39:00] to Washington and I could drink martinis all afternoon (inaudible), and we're still going to get the money." And I said, "That ain't what..." So we agreed, and so I did that. But it was. It was a -- it made a real difference.

BAYOR: And people in Washington were willing to listen to Atlanta leaders because they were [playing roles?] (inaudible).

SWEAT: Exactly. And it made my job easier. You know, I became semi-famous for all the federal money I brought in here. But I said, "Listen, you get a trained seal to go up there and gotten it really," but my philosophy was get there first. I had the advantage of being here with all that behind us. I mean, my philosophy was always be there first. [This was the most?] -- [they said when?] -- anytime a new program came along where it was modeled [cities?] or whatever -- it was whatever, the first application they received was from Atlanta, and I would... I've never modeled cities. They require such a -- such an application. [00:40:00] I sent two young people in a station wagon to deliver the application, took a station wagon. I took this one (inaudible), just both hands weighting me down, and flew up there to be there first, and then (inaudible) while the other stuff is coming along. So Allen -- I remember, you know, when the poverty program started -- not started, but when it was going to be reviewed. I had just left the poverty program wherein [Chip?] organized the (inaudible), and going over to City Hall to do this. And so we got a call for (inaudible), and

said, you know, we want -- Mayor Allen, would you come up and try to help us get some votes out of the Georgia delegation? So the mayor and I went up there, and it was -- we made rounds, and it was fun, you know. [I'd just like to see?] (inaudible) staff, [because I think it's great?] (inaudible), but we -- I think we started out with -- [00:41:00] we figured we had four votes, and I think we lost one in the process, (laughter) making the rounds. But it was interesting, but there was a -- we were sitting up in the gallery -- he was the only mayor in America sitting up there while they were [voting?]. That said something for Johnson, and (inaudible) the rest of the guys -- when I went back up -- the money, that was all -- and I never will forget, he said -- he was going down to talk to Maston O'Neal. [He couldn't get him?]. Maston O'Neal was a Congressman from Southwest Georgia -- Bainbridge, (inaudible) -- and Allen said, "Well, I'm going down there and see if I can get that guy to do (inaudible)." I said, "Well, good luck." And I saw O'Neal (inaudible) come get him and go back to the courtroom, and in a few minutes I saw O'Neal went back, and the mayor comes up. He's red-faced. I mean, he just -- smoke's coming out of his ears. [00:42:00] I said, "Did you get his vote?" [What did that son of a bitch say?] He said, "Mr. Mayor," he said, "why



don't y'all just leave us alone?" He said, "If you'd just leave us alone with our niggers and mules down in South Georgia, we'll be happy and they'll be happy." And so he said -- [the Mayor's retorted he said?] "Mr. Congressman, I don't know what you're doing with your mules, but you're sending all your niggers to Atlanta ill-prepared, ill-qualified, untrained, uneducated, and this is what this program is all about." And that was the end of that.

(laughter)

BAYOR: But you did get a lot of support in Washington on the basis of that.

SWEAT: A lot of support. A lot of support.

BAYOR: I was also curious about the importance of racial factors in decision making in the city, in the Allen administration, and Marsell, the business community. [00:43:00] There was a comment in 1975 which I think Maynard Jackson made that race is the underlying force in the area's politics, no matter what the rhetoric. I'm just curious what, you know, what --

SWEAT: That's still true today.

BAYOR: -- what role did...

SWEAT: Still true today, but probably from an [opposite?] point of view.

BAYOR: In what sense?

SWEAT: The race thing, but mainly it was perceived... And truth be told, you're coming from white to black instead of from black to white.

BAYOR: Well, do you think -- I mean, I think Ivan Allen made a statement that almost every decision he made had a racial factor.

SWEAT: In this city, that's true. This city -- the thing that probably has distinguished this city more than any other city, and (inaudible) more than anything else, is the racial situation because of the black leadership, the whole civil rights leadership. It came from here through the Atlanta university system. And so that's been true, and it's still true to this day. I wish it weren't, and I -- you know, we will be a utopia when we finally get to that point where that's not true, but it is true to a large extent.

BAYOR: [00:44:00] I was also curious about Allen's attempt to put more blacks in the city departments in his administration. Apparently there were some complaints from blacks that while he was voicing that, that there was a lot of resistance from department heads on placing blacks in --

SWEAT: There was a lot of resistance. You still had the old [line?] department, who is fiercely loyal to the city, and the city was their life. They had been hired way back in

the Depression era, many of them, and, I mean, they were the city. And under the -- a weak mayor system and the automatic system, there wasn't a lot the mayor could do except encourage. There was that great (inaudible) great reluctance coming out of the old traditions, old (inaudible). There was just not a big push. That's the reason in -- when Massell came in, and Massell and I, sitting right over in the [Marriot?] -- the old [Marriot?] (inaudible) site, [00:45:00] when we decided whether I was going to stay with him or not. I said, "You know, I -- you have my resignation, Mr. Mayor. I think you should have your own person."

(break in tape)

SWEAT: (inaudible) [black department heads?].

BAYOR: So (inaudible).

SWEAT: And so we talked -- we looked to say, "OK, who are the first two that will be leaving, retiring?" Personnel director, General Sutherland, and [Ray Nixon?] because (inaudible).

BAYOR: That's under Massell.

SWEAT: Under Massell. And I was charged with finding (inaudible) [blanks?], and I [didn't know the whole story?]

--

BAYOR: But even at that point I guess there was still resistance to bringing black people in.

SWEAT: There -- certainly there was resistance, mm-hmm.

BAYOR: OK. And I guess, in a sense, Jackson being the first black mayor, (inaudible) steamrolled it through finally.

SWEAT: Well, yeah, there was some progress made under Massell. You have to give him credit, because those two department heads, my replacement, which turned out to be a disaster for Jackson, Emma Darnell, we hired to replace me as the federal aid coordinator when I became the chief administrative officer [00:46:00] of the first black mayor, a professional in the mayor's office. Well, we brought in some -- at the top level, just jumping over the whole system, but... And I think Massell needs to be given credit for that in history, but it was not until Jackson came with his social agenda, which he had to do full force, full speed.

BAYOR: I was also curious about the Atlanta school compromise in 1972. I have (inaudible) worked out between the Chamber of Commerce, and (inaudible).

SWEAT: That's an area that I was not involved in those discussions.

BAYOR: Well, (inaudible) Fulton County (inaudible) involved with. How much has this been opposed or supported on racial terms?

SWEAT: Ninety-nine and eight-tenths percent on racial grounds, in my view. There's -- you know, it makes so much sense in every other way. The only problem is the race, as I see it. And my argument, when I brought that topic up [00:47:00] again a few years ago to, you know, try get some discussion going -- it did for a while, and I (inaudible) for a long time (inaudible), and... But that's OK. But -- you know, and I was [immediately?] jumped on (inaudible) there even back then. But Marvin, some of the blacks see it as a way to water down the black vote, and when I was named chairman of the [Charter?] (inaudible) Committee a couple years ago, [I believe?], I got sucked into that, and Zell Miller didn't suck me in, but the process -- it was a lost cause, because it was perceived by some folks as an attempt to move toward consolidation rather than look at city charter. I'm going to write the history of that as I finally found out what was really behind it and who did it, but -- and they never owned up to it. So we tried -- I remember Marvin [came?] a kneejerk to this, it's another attempt by white developers and all [00:48:00] to water

down the black vote and control the [city?], which is not what it was all about.

BAYOR: Apparently when Jackson first came in as mayor, one of the very first suggestions was that there should be Fulton County (inaudible) consolidation. You know, it seemed to be brought in particularly as part of the charge that Jackson was anti-white and (inaudible).

SWEAT: That -- you know, it -- some of us had been talking about that. I talked about it when I was in DeKalb County. And Charlie Emmerich, way back when Maynard Jackson was probably still in law school where he was, Charlie Emmerich, who I worked for there, we created the old Metropolitan Planning Committee. Well, he was involved in that. (inaudible) that, but the (inaudible) policy on [public governance?]. And frankly, we saw it as a [full runner?] way back before the racial thing ever came up. So that might've been the motive behind somebody, but not those of us who'd been looking for a long, long time [00:49:00] at the need to, as the region grows, need to make adjustments to provide realistic management of the resources (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) --

BAYOR: Economically it makes sense, sure.

SWEAT: Yeah. And what I've argued, and with some of the whites, in particular, on the inside that have -- see it as

a race... I say, "Wait a minute. The county now..." [I built particularly this sort of window of optimism?]. "The county now is controlled by black politicians. You've got the chairman of the county commission, black control now, black sheriff. So what's the big deal?" I said, "Wouldn't... It makes sense." And I said, "As a citizen of Atlanta, I plan to be here, whether the blacks control it or who controls it." And you'd rather be part of controlling an 80-mile long city that cuts a swath right up through the region, so that if, you know, DeKalb County's got to go through you to get to Cobb County, Douglas County's got to go through Rockdale, etc., [00:50:00] and you control the major resource, the heart of it, or would you rather sit back here and say, "No, you're trying to do something... We'll just control the city, which is a shrinking part of the whole every day the clock ticks. So you're going to end up here controlling an island, and I'm going to fight to keep that island healthy, and I've done that here, economically, and I will fight till the day they drag me out. But wouldn't you rather control this [I don't know?] where you've got all this growth potential, 400-car golden triangle up there, all the South Fulton land now that's available for development? And there are some very narrow-minded whites that have political positions that

feel like if you widen that, they would lose their political base. I was -- we were accused -- I was accused by Marvin, again, in that charter thing of being a (inaudible) for Lomax, create this new [00:51:00] county that Lomax had proved he could get elected in to -- so Lomax would have a mayorship and so forth, which is (inaudible).

BAYOR: I was also curious about the Action Forum. Do you know when exactly that started?

SWEAT: I don't know the exact date.

BAYOR: Sixties, 1960s?

SWEAT: In late '60s, or right at the turn of '70, somewhere around there.

BAYOR: And what exactly did...?

SWEAT: It is... Phil Calloway was, I think, part of the Action Forum, but Paul Austin and John [Fulman?] and some others [were together?], and it was -- let's see... And I think by and large it's been good, to provide communications sort of on an equal basis between black and white leadership. And it's a sort of a self-perpetuating hand-picked group, and that's always been an argument, but -- where there's an equal number of blacks and whites.

BAYOR: Right from the beginning it was equal.



SWEAT: Equal number. That was set up to be that way.

[00:52:00] And it's continued that way till this day. It's a forum, is what it is. I have served [as an ex officio?] member, along with the executive of the Chamber of Commerce, for 10, 12, 15 years, since I've been here, and - - because we always used to say, well, it's really... They got the forum, we got the action. And they'd rather -- we have to [go in there?] because the... Although they don't -- the Action Forum doesn't sit there and call the shots and give the direction. I mean, I've heard (inaudible) us at the Chamber, "Hell no, that ain't the way it works." But if there's -- you know, [out of a lot of the?] dialogue, and it's been a good pull to get whites and blacks to agree on things, and generally if there's going to be any long-term, sustained action and so forth, we either do it or the Chamber does or the business community. We are the institutional arm (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) --

BAYOR: (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) [comparable?] between the [Action?] and the business community (inaudible) [00:53:00] the Action Forum (inaudible) during that period?

SWEAT: It... Yeah, I think that a lot of good. Maynard was always suspicious of it, and (laughter) I remember the

first time Maynard -- that I recall he came to a meeting of the Action Forum -- they were meeting down in the Peachtree Center, [from under the?] Midnight Sun, a little room off there. And we met on Saturday morning, met on Saturday morning. And Maynard was [advised?], so Maynard comes to the Action Forum. And he was always uptight with it, but (inaudible) always won out, and we all -- Saturday morning, we all parked along Peachtree Center, (inaudible) [Street?] back then. (inaudible) [practice?] Saturday morning, no problem. We came up next Saturday afternoon, (inaudible) left. Everybody had a ticket on their car. Every [one?] (inaudible).

BAYOR: [00:54:00] (inaudible).

SWEAT: It... There are some that still feel like Maynard was sending the message to the Action Forum. Others said it was just accidental and so forth.

BAYOR: Yeah. But it did function to bring (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) --

SWEAT: Oh, yeah, it functioned -- I think it probably served... It did serve a very good function of letting off steam, so forth... You know, and I can remember a lot of, a lot of discussions in that Action Forum by itself. Joe Lowry was an active member, and he had taken everybody [to the Action Forum?], all the whites.

BAYOR: Well, it kept the lines open.

SWEAT: Yeah. And I think it still does.

BAYOR: Yeah. I guess just one or two more questions. I was curious also about what the business community's reaction was to Jackson's second campaign and administration? Was there... Was there more acceptance in 1977 when he ran again?

SWEAT: Well, there was more acceptance [00:55:00] because it's a foregone conclusion, you know. There was an attempt to try to find the great white hope on the part of a lot of the business community who really had it up to here with Jackson at that point. There was a significant attempt to do that. And, of course, Sidney Marcus came in. Sidney Marcus wasn't the handpicked white hope of those that were looking for it. He wasn't. Sidney was a good guy, and man, I wish he were still here in our delegation, because he was very influential, but... Now, so a lot of them supported Sidney, though he wasn't really a part of the business community at all.

BAYOR: He wasn't part of (inaudible).

SWEAT: That's right.

BAYOR: Well, I guess in the same sense Massell wasn't part of (inaudible).

SWEAT: Yeah.

BAYOR: OK, let me see... The other thing I was otherwise curious about was the -- whether there are any records of the CAP or any central improvement association (inaudible) [00:56:00] some point? Files, records, newsletters? Whatever you...?

SWEAT: Yeah. Yeah, what I'll do is just get you with my research director, and we'll share anything we've got with you. You know, we... I said when we... Well, I guess at some point -- I think maybe the last time we moved from upstairs downstairs in the First National Building, I had sent -- got rid of a lot of stuff [and sent whatever we had?] to the Historical Society.

BAYOR: Oh, yeah.

SWEAT: The Historical Society... So they're -- they've probably got some of the old stuff that I sent out there, and I sent it to Franklin [Jarrett?].

BAYOR: They have the [Centralized Improvement Association?] (inaudible)?

SWEAT: They probably have some of that in there. And we've got Jennifer Echols, my research director, [00:57:00] and one of the things that we do have, 'cause I was going over it recently, is got a notebook of old newsletters dating back, including the (inaudible) newsletters from the beginning of the organization. That's probably going to be

your best takeoff point, because it does provide not an in-depth but a pretty good (inaudible) the history from when it was --

BAYOR: OK, thank you.

SWEAT: -- not when it was formed, back in '41, initially, but at some point, probably -- probably... Well, up until the '60s, really, (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) --

BAYOR: Well, you have the [Uptown?] Association, too. I guess that was part of the merger that took place during that time.

SWEAT: Yeah, during the merger, as the merger was coming in. That's where we sort of pick up (inaudible) the newsletter back then.

BAYOR: Well, I'm curious to see what you have on urban renewal, 'cause I'm doing some work with that. I spoke to [Clarence Stone?], I think the (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) --

SWEAT: Yeah.

BAYOR: I spoke to him. [I think he said?] (inaudible).

SWEAT: [00:58:00] Yeah, and Jennifer will do that, share with you --

BAYOR: Sure.

SWEAT: -- whatever you got.

BAYOR: Great. Well, thanks very much.

SWEAT: OK. Good luck.

BAYOR: Very helpful.

END OF AUDIO FILE