not adversing Commission on avil desorders
AN OUTLINE OF THE DECEMBER REPORT )

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

# A. The Presidential Directive:

A statement of the terms of the Presidential
Directive setting forth the four basic
instructions supplemented by the President's
statement to the Commission containing 14
specific questions and several general questions
summarizing the task of the Commission.

# B. Background of the Report:

A brief factual summary of the events leading to the establishment of the Commission including the 1964-67 wave of disorders and a description of the trend in the number and magnitude of the disorders.

#### II. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

A. Answers to the President's Questions:

Summary of the answers to certain of the questions set forth in I-A (indicating questions to be answered in the final report).

# B. Recommended Actions:

Summary of recommendations concerning actions to be taken to reduce the extent and severity of civil disorders and to affect the underlying conditions which generate them. C. Reasons for the Interim Report:

A statement of the reasons for the Commission's decision to publish its interim report at this time, an explanation of the Report's limited scope, and a preview of its relationship to the final report.

III. WHAT HAPPENED AND HOW IT HAPPENED: WHAT DID WE LEARN?

A. The Composite Profile:

A narrative account of the prototype, full-blown riot, indicating each major stage. This narrative would be based upon information from the field investigations. At each stage of the "action" the narrative would indicate those kinds of incidents which ended at that stage and those which proceeded to other stages. Emphasis would be placed on the differing roles of various groups (youth, looters, agitators, etc.) at differing stages.

B. The Analytic Picture:

A more detailed analysis of the riots in terms of --

 Type of communities (demographic and other statistical characteristics) which experienced riots as compared with those which did not.

- 2. Type of pre-riot climates.
  - a. Levels of grievance and tension and their causes, including recent racial problems and incidents.
  - b. Inter-city influences (e.g. outside agitators).
  - c. Nature of ghetto leadership.
- 3. Types of disorders and their severity.
  - a. Triggering incidents.
  - b. Degrees of intensity and duration in specific disorders.
  - c. Patterns of violence and looting as related to the intensity of the disorders.
  - d. Propagation and intensification patterns within the city (role of rumor, media, etc.)
- 4. Type of rioters.
  - a. Socio-economic, organizational and previous arrest background.
  - b. Types of participation -- specific role (looters, snipers, etc.) and intensity of participation in each role.
  - c. Location of rioters -- the relationship between the point of arrest and residence.
  - d. Degree of organization.
- 5. Patterns of propagation among cities.
  - a. Build-up of tension thoughout the summer.

- b. Geographic spreading: the cluster effect.
- c. The role of media.
- 6. Types of police and National Guard response.
  - a. Nature of police response at each stage of developing violence.
  - b. Effectiveness of these responses.
  - c. Specific patterns regarding deployment of forces, communications, severity of force used, etc.
- 7. Interaction among government agencies within and outside municipal government.
  - a. Involvement of the mayor and other local non-police officials (including fire department, human relations commissions, and poverty officials.)
  - b. Involvement of state and general agencies.
- 8. Other responses during the disorders.
  - a. Negro leadership and organizations.
  - b. White community leadership and organizations.
- 9. Types and extent of injury and damage.
  - a. Individuals killed or injured.
  - b. Property damage.

- i. Patterns of property damage i.e., selected vs. random.
- ii: Magnitude of property damage.
- iii. Owners of damaged property.

## C. The Attitudinal Picture:

A survey and evaluation of the various studies of Negro and white attitudes which have been undertaken since Watts.

- 1. With specific reference to civil disorders.
  - a. UCLA study of Watts
  - b. Spiegel's study of six communities
  - c. Harper's studies of the white reaction to the Rochester riots
  - d. McCord's study of Watts, San Francisco and Houston
  - e. Milbrath's study of Buffalo
  - f. Masotti's study of Cleveland
  - g. Kaplan and Lafayette Clinic's study
    of Detroit
- 2. With reference to Negro and white attitudes on the general subject of interracial problems (e.g., Lou Harris Newsweek polls)

### IV. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

- A. Violence in America
- B. The Roots of Negro Alienation


## V: THE APPARENT CAUSES OF GRIEVANCE, TENSION AND DISORDER

## A. Causes with High Visibility:

- Police-community relations and hostility toward authority.
- 2. Black Power ideology and appeals to violence.
- Rising expectations and frustrations and decreasing apprehensions.
- 4. Lack of other means for expression of social and economic frustrations.

# B. Underlying causes:

- Decline in the strength of traditional institutions of social control (family, school, church, etc.).
- Decline in the legitimacy of authority in relation to matters involving issues of social justice.
- 3. Social pathology of the ghettos.
  - a. Confinement (racial compound)
  - b. Lack of employment and income
  - c. Low quality of basic services and facilities
  - d. Feelings of powerlessness and lack of stake in the society
  - e. High rates of crime and violence
- VI. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE COMMUNITY'S CAPABILITY
  TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER.
  - A. Recommendations Relating to the Reduction of Grievances and Tensions Which Lead to Civil Disorders:



- The role of city government with respect to ghetto areas.
  - a. Mayor and Council
  - b. Local agencies (other than police)
  - c. Police
- 2. Role of the community at large.
- 3. Role of the minority community.
- B. Recommendations relating to the control of disorder and mass violence.

- 1. Response of the city government and police
  - a. Strategic intelligence (knowing what to expect).
  - b. Tactical intelligence (knowing what is happening).
  - c. Decision making (controlling the response).
  - d. Communication (fighting rumors with facts in riot areas and in the community at large).
  - e. Negotiation (contacting participant group leadership).
- 2. Police, fire and military operations
  - a. Preparation (planning and training and emergency logistics).
  - Integration of command (centralized control of operations).
  - c. Tactical communication (maximizing the effectiveness of the response).
  - d. How to mount effective tactical operations and control the degree of force (protecting against escalation by accident).
- 3. Administration of justice
  - a. Identification and recordation.
  - b. Detention.
  - c. Arraignment.
  - d. Bail.
  - e. Counsel.
  - f. Speedy trial:

### VII. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACTION PROGRAMS

## A. What Are We Doing Now:

- 1. Description of major program groups in terms of type, scope, objectives and success.
- 2. Analysis of the system in terms of
  - a. Delivery of services.
  - b. Effectiveness.
  - c. Relationship to civil disorder.

## B. What We Can Do Immediately:

- Principles (visibility, cost, administration, structure, etc.)
- 2. Existing program reforms.
- 3. New program directions.
- 4. How to do it in terms of funding.
  - a. Redirection of existing federalprogram commitments.
  - Increased efficiency of federal and local programs.
  - c. Private sector participation.
  - d. Additional joint federal-state-local funding.
- VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO MEDIA PROBLEMS.
- .IX. RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INSURANCE PROBLEMS.