Box 22, Folder 2, Document 48

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Box 22, Folder 2, Document 48

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“T, Basic Premise

The basic premise of this vropoctc? cn oroeech to an aserda is the following

-roposition: There is widesnread dissatisfaction with the present svecific-—vcrorrom

nnnronch of the federal covernnont to urb2n rroblems; therefore our task shonld he

a ne eee —

to mosnond to this dissetisfacti) x __—_— meet in the most meenine?nl
possible ways. Such Ciscatisfectio: ji° ee one of the main conclusions
which emerred from the Ribicoff hesrings, and it also is the theme of Paul Ylviscrker'
eorlier “agenda. vaper." Both there cocuments called for an as—yet—unfornnliter

"netr anproach" to vrban oroblem-. W“owever, seeking a new anproach is not the oniy


“oscible or relevant resnonse to seme Cissatisfeaction with the effectivenerc o7f

existine annroaches. In fect, thefe are four snossible responses, all of which

have some merit.

II. Tosrible Renvonses to the Basic Premise

Thene four reanonses ean be put in the form of the followine cuestions, here st-t77

with come tentative idens about bow they micht be answered:

1. Is it really true that current vroerams are ineffective? Although

it in certainly truco that cvrrent f

| single oo |
the mador trends in o+yeeppime city, they may; be quite effective in relstion

ederal vrosrams have not "turned srours"

to the efforts nut into them. However, we really do not know how effective

they ore becansce we fo not have any wave to measure prosram effectiverecs


in SMR urbon oreac very accurately. Therefore, this resnonse surce>

that the Tesk Force exvlore the following issues:

“me, “hot mechonions for effective vrorram evaluation ean be eronted ane

sustained at both Local and federal levels? What alternative arv-roachec
to vrosr-m evaluation ire vossible, and what incentives could be
mobiliged to effectuate each?

Ze --—Tow con future decision-making be affected so that more alternative

vrogrem possibilities will be looked at, locally and federally?

Is the ineffectiveness of current programs possibly caused by their

inncdequate scale rather thon innynropriate design —— hence would they
become much more effective if croatly expanded in magnitude? When the
eorly government snendine ~rorrams advanced by Franklin Roosevelt's
ers cdministration to cure the Grest Depression Pignled out in the
downturn of 1937, many critics blamed the poor design of these programs an¢

condemned the entire ides of federal spending as an aid to prosperity. But

then when governmont enencine really became enormous in the war effort

of the early Ses 1940's, wnemmloyment and recession vanished 21most
instantly, and the economy expenred wivilian outnout at the same time that

it vroduced hure amounts of military goodse To most economists, this
exnerience dramatically vroved that government snending indeed can banish
unemoloyment and recession if undertaken on a large enough scale to be
effective, Similarly, it can verhnps be argued that urban renewal and
nublic housins have foiled to wemmmm "solve the low-income hovsine nroblem"
mainly because they have been unfertaken in such tiny amounts. lven the

Aesim flows in these nrogeroms (such as creating massive concentretions of


broken families in nublic honsing develomments) might be radically altered
if the vrogreams were exvarded in scale by a factor of, say, 10 to 20, since

2 ereatly exnandecd clientele would have to be served.

It seems crucial for the ‘Task Force to answer this question for the

following reasons:

a, Insofar as inadequate scale alone is resnonsible for any aneffectivenes
of current vrograms, it might be a gross social policy error to shift

emphasis to looking for some non-existent "new aonroach" when the real
need wae for more of the old anvroaches.

fara And! Kor Congress ,

be. There is a tendency for various federal agencies to look for some

relotively inexpensive "cure" for urban shetto vroblems. If this

tendency is inherently bound to fail because all "cures" are extremely

costly, the President should be anprised of this fact so he will not
delude himself considering "chean cures," and so he can begin influencifig

public opinion to recent the costliness of adecuate measures.

Pursuing this resvonse to the basic vremise would cause the Task Force

to investigate the actuol vast marnitude of each major federal urban program
4 tr

(as measured in total and annual expenditures over, say, the past 30 years)

measure of the
acainst some se univerce in which that program must onerate. Far examole,

* :
total public houvsine ernenditures —- and results in terms of units built —-


might be compared to total U.S. exnenditures on housins cons truction, oné
units built in the U.
beet gene Senarate chleuvlations might be made in sub-areas (such

as Nex oie where the relrtive scale might be much higher than the national
averare, just to test what might hapnen if the national effort were raiéger,.
Similar quantifications could be made for health programs, welfare vrocrans,
urban renewal, anti-delincuency vrograms, etc. Results micht be similar

to those already mode in agriculture, where it can be shown that over 40%

of all form income in the 1.5. comes directly from federal payments.

What ste some nossible alternatives to the current vrogrammatic a roach?
Diseatisfrction with whet we heave does not necescarily vrove there are

better ways to do thines; verhaps the truth is merely that "life is tough."

Yet the followin alternotives might be fruitfully investigater by the

nr. Crentine stroncer incentives for private effort and_investment in

producing solutions to urban shetto problems. Svecifically, the
follovine tyves of incentives might be, investigated:
wflaluts sg: akicank/ by having
hi pees O eita voccible siimagmme the federrl rovernment create
* significant market for some service relevant to the chetto, svch
og rehabilitater honsines, jobs for unskilled and vroblem wor'cers¢

(created by narine employers premiums to hire ond use them), new

housing, and ecucational vororrams,



other :


Romovin> oxistine incentives to “act badly" in chetto 2reac, such
as low assessment for slum property, high depreciation allowances, =
any denrecittion cllowance at all for property not in full complianc
to codes, countinz srch non-compliance property as an-asset for
financial institutions, 2a and higher property assessments for
rehabilitated -ronerty,

Refuction of red—tane end remilation through such programs as the
"turn-key" aprroach to sublic housing.

Creation of nermisnive incentives through crefits for

investments in chettos or certain kinds of job training.

Shiftine the locus of em crocrem formulation or the allocation of

resources to urhan rroblemn avay from the federal covernment to sone

snot. The following methods of redistributing income collected

by the federal covernment would be means of accomolishing this:




Givine block grants to states,

Givine block rrants to central citier,

Crectin=™ a microntesd onnual income for at least those nersons
now on welfnre of socirl security who cannot be empectec to work.
Civine block eroent«-to metronolitan areas that create aren-vide
eovernments to use them,

Conbinine ~resent feder nl rrants into broader “comvrehenctve

-ropram erants."

-The Task Force mirht investigate 211 of these devices in orver to

anciver the followings cuestions about erch one:

What se ,

—What "strings" should be attached to such income transfers? What

oe pak uo) “Oy 4 nets

institution. l chonre should be aimed at “ach “nurchacec of


troule be necessary to versurde the institutions

involved to make the Aecinog chang es?
—-—hat would the recinients be likely to do with the money?
~——How larre 2 multixlier effect would such money have?
aiftfery from ite offects: if retained by the federal Povevtneet>
—-ahhat is the net desir-bility of this’ device?
Since the Model Cities “roernzm can be viewed as a device for shifting

° : « my e
some control over »rorrens to ldcal rovernments, it might be evaluates

under this headine too.

t/changes or additions to current programs can be relatively easily

identified to make them more effective? In svite of the seeminzly

widesvread feeling that “morcinal tinkering" with vresent procvrams will

not nroduce any significont imnrovements in cities, some/chanres or new

orogram noesi cc omicht be sme relatively ensily identified. Exomnle:
micht be as follows:
a, Creatine a PUD Assistent Secretary for Research with a sitenificant


rerearch budvret, 25 recommended carlier.
be Croatine ceattered site onblic housinc Gime rentine existing ¢welliner
. co on to Aisnerse Nerro an low-income families to all parts of each
natronoliten 1rea, egnecinlly nerrer job onrortrunitiess.

ce Chanrine FA vroceturec in a variety of mecific ways, inclvding

renarction of "norudent investor" activity from "social-uncervritorn"
a. FPollowine the recommendations about neighborhood centers and subsidizer

hone ownershin made errlier.

Thus, from there four resvonses to the basic premise, the Tosk Porce can formulote
a. number of cnecific renenrch projects for investization by the staff and ovtcide

exnerte, Polier conrlusions for the final revort can then be besed nnon there

+ ase

TIT. Sugrested Methods of Procee” ne |

It is sugrested that the Task Force nrroceed on the basis of the following

recommendations and’ actions:

1. All four of the responses Aecerihbe? xbove should be vursued, rather than
any one or tro alone.
. <
» Subcommittees should be formes to vursue these four resvonses -—— nerhans
one subcommittesc for each rocnonse, or perhaps with a different division
of lnbor, but keyed to the four-responce format.

2, Sneeific research cssienments should be defined for 211 four resvonces by
the Task Force as a whole incofer as nossible, and then by subcommittees
meetine senarately,

4, These research assienments chould be assigned to both staff members and
"outside experts" where the exnertise of the latter isrelevant., Money
should be procvred to nav such exnerts for pavers focussed on their nolicr
views or factunl views, varying from case to case. (The term "both" coer
not. 2741y overlanning nssicmments, but utilization of both tynes of service.)

5. Tentative renortine dates for 211 research assignments should be crenter
within the nort month, thoveh the d¢ntes may be later than that.

6. After rorortinge dates ind -ssienments are set, a full time-toble for the
Task Foree choula be created. If necessary, further extension of our

time reriod should be reruested.

A, Downs



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